Text: 20 YEARS AFTER 9/11: THE STATE OF THE TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION
[House Hearing, 117 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
20 YEARS AFTER 9/11: THE STATE OF THE
TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED SEVENTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
SEPTEMBER 29, 2021
__________
Serial No. 117-30
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.govinfo.gov
__________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
46-486 PDF WASHINGTON : 2022
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi, Chairman
Sheila Jackson Lee, Texas John Katko, New York
James R. Langevin, Rhode Island Michael T. McCaul, Texas
Donald M. Payne, Jr., New Jersey Clay Higgins, Louisiana
J. Luis Correa, California Michael Guest, Mississippi
Elissa Slotkin, Michigan Dan Bishop, North Carolina
Emanuel Cleaver, Missouri Jefferson Van Drew, New Jersey
Al Green, Texas Ralph Norman, South Carolina
Yvette D. Clarke, New York Mariannette Miller-Meeks, Iowa
Eric Swalwell, California Diana Harshbarger, Tennessee
Dina Titus, Nevada Andrew S. Clyde, Georgia
Bonnie Watson Coleman, New Jersey Carlos A. Gimenez, Florida
Kathleen M. Rice, New York Jake LaTurner, Kansas
Val Butler Demings, Florida Peter Meijer, Michigan
Nanette Diaz Barragan, California Kat Cammack, Florida
Josh Gottheimer, New Jersey August Pfluger, Texas
Elaine G. Luria, Virginia Andrew R. Garbarino, New York
Tom Malinowski, New Jersey
Ritchie Torres, New York
Hope Goins, Staff Director
Daniel Kroese, Minority Staff Director
Natalie Nixon, Clerk
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Statements
The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Mississippi, and Chairman, Committee on
Homeland Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 1
Prepared Statement............................................. 4
The Honorable John Katko, a Representative in Congress From the
State of New York, and Ranking Member, Committee on Homeland
Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 5
Prepared Statement............................................. 13
Witnesses
Mr. David P. Pekoske, Administrator, Transportation Security
Administration:
Oral Statement................................................. 15
Prepared Statement............................................. 16
Mr. Peter V. Neffenger, Private Citizen, Former Administrator,
Transportation Security Administration:
Oral Statement................................................. 22
Prepared Statement............................................. 24
Mr. John S. Pistole, President, Anderson University, Former
Administrator, Transportation Security Administration:
Oral Statement................................................. 26
Prepared Statement............................................. 27
Mr. James M. Loy, Private Citizen, Former Administrator,
Transportation Security Administration:
Oral Statement................................................. 28
Prepared Statement............................................. 30
For the Record
The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Mississippi, and Chairman, Committee on
Homeland Security:
Statement of American Federation of Government Employees, AFL-
CIO.......................................................... 3
The Honorable John Katko, a Representative in Congress From the
State of New York, and Ranking Member, Committee on Homeland
Security:
Statement of Honorable Michael Chertoff........................ 6
Statement of Kip Hawley........................................ 9
The Honorable Michael Guest, a Representative in Congress From
the State of Mississippi:
Photo.......................................................... 42
Appendix
Questions From Chairman Bennie G. Thompson for David P. Pekoske.. 71
Question From Hon. J. Luis Correa for David P. Pekoske........... 71
Questions From Hon. Michael Guest for David P. Pekoske........... 71
Questions From Hon. Diana Harshbarger for David P. Pekoske....... 72
Questions From Hon. Carlos A. Gimenez for David P. Pekoske....... 72
20 YEARS AFTER 9/11: THE STATE OF THE TRANSPORTATION SECURITY
ADMINISTRATION
----------
Wednesday, September 29, 2021
U.S. House of Representatives,
Committee on Homeland Security,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:30 a.m., via
Webex, Hon. Bennie G. Thompson [Chairman of the committee]
presiding.
Present: Representatives Thompson, Jackson Lee, Langevin,
Payne, Correa, Cleaver, Green, Clarke, Titus, Watson Coleman,
Demings, Barragan, Gottheimer, Katko, Higgins, Guest, Van Drew,
Norman, Miller-Meeks, Harshbarger, Clyde, Gimenez, LaTurner,
Meijer, Cammack, Pfluger, and Garbarino.
Chairman Thompson. The Committee on Homeland Security will
come to order. The committee is meeting today to receive
testimony on the state of Transportation Security
Administration 20 years after 9/11. Without objection, the
Chair is authorized to declare the committee in recess at any
point.
Good morning. I want to thank TSA Administrator David
Pekoske as well as former administrators Peter Neffenger, John
Pistole, and James Loy for being with us today and for their
leadership in safeguarding our Nation. Let me say that we have
never had assembled before this committee such an august group
of individuals who have done so much to keep us as a Nation
safe 20 years in, so I am looking forward to their testimony.
Twenty years ago, the morning of September 11, the United
States suffered the most devasting targeted attack in history.
Thousands of lives were lost and many more were changed
forever. In the weeks, months, and years that followed, the
Federal Government engaged in a massive effort to reshape our
security efforts and respond to new global threats.
Most importantly for today's hearing, it was clear that
Federal authorities needed to be responsible for safeguarding
our Nation's transportation system and so the Transportation
Security Administration was born. In its 20-year history TSA
has had 7 Senate-confirmed administrators; 4 of them are with
us today. Together they represent the majority of the history
of TSA and they can speak to the incredible changes and growth
the agency has undergone in the past 2 decades.
When TSA began amid an uncertain threat picture, a rapid
response required a ``one-size-fit-all'' approach to security
measures, primarily using simple metal detectors and X-ray
machines. Over the years, TSA has responded to evolving threats
involving terrorist tactics to advance its approach to
screening and vetting. Today, TSA utilizes modern technologies
such as advanced imaging technology and computed tomography
machines to detect a range of nonmetallic weapons.
TSA has developed a sophisticated, risk-based security
approach and leveraged intelligence, passenger vetting, and
Trusted Traveler programs to focus limited resources on the
most pressing threats. TSA must continue to evolve because we
continually face new kinds of threats.
Today threats are arising not just from violent terrorist
groups, but from lone wolf actors, cyber criminals, public
health emergencies, and unruly passengers. We have also seen
threats expand from a focus on passenger aircraft to include
other transportation modes and assets such as air cargo, mass
transit, freight and passenger rail, and pipelines.
Collectively, these threats challenge the limits of TSA's
authorities and resources, and Congress must ensure TSA remains
prepared to execute its critical security mission. I am eager
to hear about the changes TSA has undergone to meet those
threats and allow Americans to travel securely throughout the
on-going global pandemic.
Unfortunately, even with all the modern improvements TSA
has made, some issues have remained stagnant. The agency has
struggled throughout its history to create a well-compensated,
empowered, and fulfilled work force. I am happy to see the
Biden administration taking steps to improve the situation.
On Monday, Administrator Pekoske announced a new Memorandum
of Agreement with the Merit Systems Protection Board, or MSPB,
under which the MSPB has agreed to review adverse action
appeals from front-line officers. This action responds to long-
standing calls for a fair third-party disciplinary appeals
process for the TSA work force. I commend Administrator
Pekoske, Secretary Mayorkas, and the Biden administration for
taking this important step. Still, a change in the law and
significant funding will be needed to provide TSA workers with
the workplace rights and the competitive pay they deserve.
To that end, I look forward to continuing to advance my
bill, the Rights for the TSA Workforce Act of 2021, which this
committee marked up in July.
Before I close, I would also note, as Chairman I strive to
bring diverse witness panels before the committee. Although
there has been some diversity among TSA's leadership over the
years, only White male administrators have ever been confirmed
by the Senate to lead the Transportation Security
Administration. I hope TSA will increase the diversity of its
leadership both for its work force as well as the American
people.
As we look ahead, the successes as well as the missteps of
the past 2 decades will help guide our mission to provide
Americans with a safe, efficient, and secure transportation
system. I look forward to reflecting on those issues today.
Before I recognize the Ranking Member and without
objection, I include in the record a statement from the
American Federation of Government Employees on the subject of
today's hearing.
[The information follows:]
Statement of American Federation of Government Employees, AFL-CIO
September 29, 2021
Chairman Thompson, Ranking Member Katko, and Members of the
Committee: The American Federation of Government Employees, AFL-CIO
(AFGE), which represents 700,000 Federal and District of Columbia
employees in 70 agencies, including approximately 45,000 Transportation
Security Officers (TSOs) at the Transportation Security Administration
(TSA) thanks the committee for holding this important hearing today,
``20 Years After 9/11: The State of the Transportation Security
Administration.'' Indeed, by some measures the agency has experienced
tremendous progress in the past 20 years, but when it comes to fair pay
and due process, it has left its most crucial resource--the
Transportation Security Officer workforce--back in the 20th century.
When this committee held a hearing in May of this year, ``Twenty
Years of Workforce Challenges: The Need for H.R. 903, the Rights for
the TSA Workforce Act of 2021,'' AFGE testified that full rights under
title 5 of the U.S. Code, as other Federal employees are accorded,
would directly improve the ability of TSA to provide the flying public
the highest level of aviation security. We also testified to the low
morale and toxic work environment that two decades of TSA
administrators have allowed to fester and consume the TSA work culture.
AFGE urges the committee to continue to explore the impact of the
toxic work culture as it is juxtaposed against the many demands placed
on the TSO workforce as TSA has grown and changed over 20 years. Over 2
decades, TSOs have gone from operating hand wands and walk-through
metal detectors to utilizing Advanced Imaging Technology machines and
pat-downs. As TSA has invested in new technologies, TSOs have taken
training on new equipment nearly every year.
It is clear that investment in advanced technology has contributed
to 20 years of aviation security. But we ask, where is the investment
in the workforce? Where has TSA leadership been as supervisors fostered
work cultures that forced many TSOs to resign or endure harassment,
humiliation, and undue discipline?
The TSO workforce has been on the job throughout the longest
Government shutdown in American history and the COVID-19 Pandemic. Over
10,000 TSA employees, mostly those in the screening workforce, have
contracted COVID-19 and 29 have tragically lost their lives. TSA
reported earlier this month that with the imposition of checkpoint mask
mandates, there have been more than 4,000 ``mask-related incidents''
and the agency is pursuing penalties in 126 cases.\1\ That number is
likely higher as many TSOs endure punishing treatment by the flying
public they are working to protect rather than report or respond when
they sustain abusive behavior at the checkpoint. Even a cross tone
toward an unruly passenger could result in a disciplinary action where
the TSO has little or no recourse to explain mitigating factors.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ ``More than 4,000 face-mask incidents have been reported to the
TSA,'' The Washington Post, September 10, 2021
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fair treatment of the TSO workforce is a goal that should have been
a priority from Day 1 and from the top down, but it was not. In the
aftermath of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on American soil,
Congress granted the TSA administrator unusually broad authority to
develop a separate personnel management system. Congress did not grant
this authority to allow mistreatment against the TSO workforce. Now
that 20 years have passed, it is time to bring personnel management
under regular order and make the rights and compensation of the TSO
workforce a priority. This committee has favorably reported the
``Rights for the TSA Workforce Act'' and AFGE hopes to work with the
committee to achieve passage in the full House in the coming weeks.
Turnover in the screening workforce has been a persistent problem.
With very low pay and little reward for experience many TSOs go on to
other agencies where they work under the more reliable and market-based
general schedule (GS) pay scale. Elsewhere in the Federal Government,
they are guaranteed due process in disciplinary matters, whistleblower
protections and reasonable and consistent agency action when they
experience harassment and discrimination. This committee has examined
the March, 2019 Office of Inspector General Report, ``TSA Needs to
Improve Efforts to Retain, Hire, and Train Its Transportation Security
Officers'' which attributed the high attrition among TSOs to low pay
and fairness of pay and found TSOs' ``dissatisfaction with their
supervisors included management's competence, communication, promotion
of negative work environment, disrespect, lack of trust, lack of
appreciation or recognition, and unfair practices in appraisal,
discipline, and advancement.''\2\ While we do not believe the OIG's
recommendations went far enough to remedy these pay and management
failures, it is important they were identified and brought forward. In
the context of the 20-year anniversary of TSA, it is time to enact
legislation that will address these intrinsic inequities.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ Department of Homeland Security Office of Inspector General
Report, ``TSA Needs to Improve Efforts to Retain, Hire, and Train Its
Transportation Security Officers'' March 28, 2019, OIG-119-35.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
We raise our questions and concerns not to chide the administrator
or former administrators for personnel management failures, but to
ensure that human beings who perform essential homeland security
functions are not left behind in the calculation of securing the
homeland but are front and center when this agency addresses crises in
the future and sets the vision for the TSA the American public deserves
20 years from now. AFGE looks forward to working with the committee and
with TSA to achieve a better workplace and a more successful agency.
Chairman Thompson. Again, I thank our witnesses for joining
us and for their honorable and steadfast service to our Nation.
[The statement of Chairman Thompson follows:]
Statement of Chairman Bennie G. Thompson
September 29, 2021
Good morning.
I want to thank TSA Administrator David Pekoske, as well as former
Administrators Peter Neffenger, John Pistole, and James Loy for being
with us today and for their leadership in safeguarding our Nation.
Twenty years ago, on the morning of September 11, the United States
suffered the most devastating targeted attack in our history.
Thousands of lives were lost, and many more were changed forever.
In the weeks, months, and years that followed, the Federal
Government engaged in a massive effort to reshape our security efforts
and respond to new global threats.
Most importantly for today's hearing, it was clear that Federal
authorities needed to be responsible for safeguarding our Nation's
transportation system. And so, the Transportation Security
Administration was born.
In its 20-year history, TSA has had seven Senate-confirmed
administrators. Four of them are with us today.
Together, they represent the majority of the history of TSA, and
they can speak to the incredible changes and growth the agency has
undergone in the past two decades.
When TSA began amid an uncertain threat picture, a rapid response
required a ``one-size-fits-all'' approach to security measures,
primarily using simple metal detectors and X-ray machines.
Over the years, TSA has responded to evolving terrorist tactics to
advance its approach to screening and vetting.
Today, TSA utilizes modern technologies such as Advanced Imaging
Technology and Computed Tomography machines to detect a range of non-
metallic weapons.
TSA has developed a sophisticated, risk-based security approach
leveraging intelligence, passenger vetting, and trusted traveler
programs to focus limited resources on the most pressing threats.
TSA must continue to evolve, because we are continually facing new
kinds of threats.
Today, threats are arising not just from violent terrorist groups,
but from lone-wolf actors, cyber criminals, public health emergencies,
and unruly passengers.
We have also seen threats expand from a focus on passenger aircraft
to include other transportation modes and assets, such as air cargo,
mass transit, freight and passenger rail, and pipelines.
Collectively, these threats challenge the limits of TSA's
authorities and resources, and Congress must ensure TSA remains
prepared to execute its critical security mission.
I am eager to hear about the changes TSA has undergone to meet
these threats and allow Americans to travel securely throughout the on-
going global pandemic.
Unfortunately, even with all the modern improvements TSA has made,
some issues have remained stagnant.
The agency has struggled throughout its history to create a well-
compensated, empowered, and fulfilled workforce.
I am happy to see the Biden administration taking steps to improve
the situation.
On Monday, Administrator Pekoske announced a new Memorandum of
Agreement with the Merit Systems Protection Board, or MSPB, under which
the MSPB has agreed to review adverse action appeals from front-line
officers.
This action responds to long-standing calls for a fair, third-party
disciplinary appeals process for the TSA workforce.
I commend Administrator Pekoske, Secretary Mayorkas, and the Biden
administration for taking this important step.
Still, a change in the law and significant funding will be needed
to provide TSA workers with the workplace rights and the competitive
pay they deserve.
To that end, I look forward to continuing to advance my bill, the
Rights for the TSA Workforce Act of 2021, which this committee marked
up in July.
Before I close, I also must note that, as Chairman, I strive to
bring diverse witness panels before the committee.
Although there has been some diversity among TSA leadership over
the years, only white, male administrators have ever been confirmed by
the Senate to lead the Transportation Security Administration.
I hope TSA will increase the diversity of its leadership, both for
its workforce as well as the American people.
As we look ahead, the successes--as well as the missteps--of the
past two decades will help guide our mission to provide Americans with
a safe, efficient, and secure transportation system.
I look forward to reflecting on those issues today.
Again, I thank our witnesses for joining us and for their honorable
and steadfast service to our Nation.
Chairman Thompson. With that, I recognize the Ranking
Member, the gentleman from New York, Mr. Katko, for an opening
statement.
Mr. Katko. Good morning, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for
having this hearing today. I appreciate it. As you well know, I
started out as a subcommittee Chair for TSA in Homeland
Security, so this is a topic that is always near and dear to my
heart.
On September 11, 2001, 19 hijackers proceeded through U.S.
airport security and, once on-board, commandeered 4 commercial
aircraft, flying them into the World Trade Center in New York,
the Pentagon, and a field in Shanksville, Pennsylvania. Two
other people that went into the--that were flight attendants on
the American Airlines flight that crashed into the World Trade
Center were friends of mine.
The Transportation Security Administration was created in
the months after this terrorist attack and made dramatic
changes to our travel landscape. Gone are the days when you
could arrive for a flight minutes before takeoff or meet your
arriving family members at the gate, but with the immense help
of the private sector, TSA quickly stood up and established a
robust aviation screening system, and our Nation is truly
grateful.
Over the past 20 years, TSA has continuously adapted their
screening procedures based on critical intelligence and risk
while also expanding its focus on securing surface
transportation. This is exactly the type of elasticity that the
Homeland Security Committee in the wake of 9/11 envisioned.
When our committee was in New York recently at the 9/11
Museum, a memorial for the 20th anniversary of that terrible
day in our Nation's history, we all reflected on the nearly
3,000 Americans that died on 9/11. We didn't believe it was
possible at the time, but TSA and the Department of Homeland
Security have been very successful in preventing a significant
9/11-style attack of our transportation system over the last 20
years. That is an amazing feat and I want to keep it that way
for the next 20 years. I know all the Members of the committee
feel the same way.
Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent to enter written
testimonies from former Secretary Chertoff and former
Administrator Hawley into the record. We appreciate their
services as well as the service of the esteemed panelists who
are here before the committee today.
Chairman Thompson. Without objection.
[The information follows:]
Statement of Honorable Michael Chertoff
September 29, 2021
As we reflect on the twentieth anniversary of the 9/11 attacks and
the reasons behind the creation of the Transportation Security
Administration (TSA) in 2001, I believe that the underlying case for
establishing the agency is as strong as ever. On September 11, 2001, 19
terrorists executed a horrific plan to hijack aircraft and turn them
into guided missiles that destroyed the World Trade Center, damaged the
Pentagon, and killed approximately 3,000 people. In carrying out their
plot, the terrorists exploited vulnerabilities or gaps in several
security systems that were intended to protect our borders and our
aviation system. Among these weaknesses were the lack of a sufficient
program to collect and analyze information about foreign travelers
coming to the United States; insecure identification requirements for
passengers boarding flights domestically; a largely privatized
passenger and baggage screening process at the airports; and no real
security on board the aircraft itself.
After the attacks of September 11, 2001, our Nation emerged more
united and determined than ever before and worked tirelessly to
confront the new reality that our country faced. That determination led
to the creation of the TSA and, later, the Department of Homeland
Security (DHS). The most noticeable and consequential investments
included enhanced screening of people and cargo traveling into the
United States by air, sea, rail, and land. We also made successful
improvements in our ability to share information across law enforcement
agencies. DHS implemented the Law Enforcement Information Sharing
Initiative which improved how local, National, and international
agencies share information. Proof of the enhancements in our
information-sharing capabilities is evident in the 2006 thwarted plot
to detonate liquid explosives aboard airliners bound for the United
States and Canada from Great Britain. By working closely with our
overseas counterparts and the cooperation of U.S. intelligence agencies
monitoring the threat, a large-scale attack was foiled, and hundreds of
lives were saved.
During the past two decades, the United States remained largely
focused on the threat posed to our homeland by global terrorism and the
coordination of large-scale attacks by Jihadists. However, in recent
years newer threats have emerged that present the challenge of a three-
front war on terrorism.
With the degradation of ISIS and al-Qaeda capability, the United
States has now focused its budget and operational capabilities on near
peer countries. We have witnessed foreign governments, and their
sponsored proxies, conduct sophisticated cyber attacks against our
critical infrastructure and commercial software supply chains. These
countries, and their sponsored proxies, have also undertaken
sophisticated information operations against the people of America.
They have penetrated social media platforms and have exacerbated
partisan issues with the sole intention of polarizing the American
people and fomenting discontent in almost every aspect of our lives.
These adversarial agents have created an environment where both the far
left and far right are convinced of the other's intention to
``overthrow'' Federal, State, and local governments, as well as
undermine their respective affinity groups and institutions, whether
that be social justice organizations or law enforcement.
The successful information operations conducted by foreign
countries to sew distrust in our Government, and pit American against
American, have dramatically increased the on-going risk of domestic
terrorism. The events over the last 2 years by both far left and far
right organizations demonstrate the violence that can take place around
the country and in our Nation's capital, because of this polarized
discourse. The country has become more partisan, with extremists on
both sides becoming violent. There is no clearer manifestation of this
threat than the events that unfolded on January 6. Led by paramilitary
groups like the Oath Keepers and Proud Boys and communicating by way of
encrypted messaging, they launched an attack on the U.S. Capitol and
the very foundation of our Nation's democracy.
While up to now, the United States has largely been successful in
defeating centralized ISIS and al-Qaeda capability, the accelerated
withdrawal from Afghanistan provides a possible safe haven for
terrorist adversaries to reconstitute and prepare to carry out attacks
against the United States. Without a U.S. presence in Afghanistan,
America now has little if any on-the-ground visibility into nefarious
activities, let alone a local capability to disrupt planning.
Over the last 20 years, the United States has evolved from a united
populace focused on the defeat of a single threat to a fractured and
often aggressive populace whose divisions are further exacerbated
within the context of a global pandemic. The world, and America in
particular, is a much more dangerous place now, than it was right after
9/11. Today's security risk landscape requires a multi-faceted,
coordinated approach that addresses the discrete aspects of our most
pressing challenges, which include a persistent threat from the
pandemic, foreign-based terrorist threats, cybersecurity threats to
both public and private networks, and, increasingly, domestic terrorism
threats that pose a significant threat to the core of our democracy.
tsa the next 20 years
Looking ahead to the next 20 years, TSA will need to remain an
agile and entrepreneurial agency focused on implementing intelligence-
based solutions to counter evolving and increasingly sophisticated
range of physical and cybersecurity threats to the Nation's
transportation systems and infrastructure from State and non-State
actors and domestic violent extremists. TSA will need to continue to
protect and empower its workforce with more capable tools and
technology, strengthen and expand partnerships, and continue to invest
in cybersecurity capabilities to counter increasing threats against the
Nation's pipelines and transportation systems.
covid-19 response
After the emergence of COVID-19, passenger enplanement dropped as
much as 97 percent. TSA implemented measures at security checkpoints
across the Nation to make the screening process safer for passengers
and its workforce by reducing the potential of exposure to COVID-19. In
February 2021, TSA implemented provisions of President Biden's
Executive Order on Promoting COVID-19 Safety in Domestic and
International Travel by requiring passengers to wear face masks when
they are in airports, bus, and rail stations, and while on passenger
aircraft, passenger railroads, and public transportation.
These efforts to protect the traveling public helped restore
confidence and paved the way for the increased passenger volumes we are
now seeing at airports around the country. Throughout the pandemic, the
TSA workforce has served professionally adapted to challenging
circumstances.
Unfortunately, during this time, the TSA workforce has also
experienced a dramatic increase in unruly passengers at TSA checkpoints
across the country and on-board aircraft. Since January 1, 2021, TSA
has reported more than 4,000 reports of face mask-related incidents
since the requirement was implemented this year. Inflight disturbances
have risen from 2 incidents per 1 million screened in 2019 to 12 per 1
million in 2021.
In response, TSA Administrator Pekoske recently announced an
increase in the range of civil penalties that may be imposed on
individuals who violate the Federal mask mandate at airports, on
commercial aircraft, and in various modes of surface transportation.
The new penalty range will be $500-$1,000 for first offenders and
$1,000-$3,000 for second-time offenders. I support these actions and
believe TSA, the Department, and Congress must continue to do
everything they can to help protect the TSA workforce and ensure they
have the support and tools needed to address the vast array of security
and safety challenges they face every day.
tsa technology advancements
As air travelers returning to airports for the first time since
before the pandemic, many of them will see changes to the screening
technologies at security checkpoints. New state-of-the-art technology
solutions like Credential Authentication Technology (CAT) identity
verification systems and Computed Tomography X-ray machines that offer
significant advancements for identity verification and screening
passenger carry-on items, while reducing physical contact during the
screening process and improving the passenger experience.
expanding trusted traveler programs
As air travel continues to rebound and eventually exceeds pre-
pandemic levels and with funding sources expected to remain flat, TSA
must continue to expand access to TSA PreCheck and other DHS Trusted
Traveler programs that allow enrolled individuals to use expedited
lanes at airport checkpoints and when crossing international borders.
TSA must continue to work with private-sector partners to improve
marketing efforts and increase access enrollment opportunities for
PreCheck. By increasing the percentage of travelers that have been
vetted and are known to be lower risk, TSA will be better-positioned to
provide those individuals with an expedited checkpoint experience while
also applying a greater portion of its limited resources to those
passengers that require a greater level of screening at the checkpoint.
TSA PreCheck also offers an opportunity for introducing new
technologies to enhance the effectiveness and efficiency of security
screening process. Recent biometric technology pilots have shown the
potential to be powerful tools for improving the identity verification
of passengers enrolled in TSA PreCheck, which enhances security
effectiveness, improves operational efficiency, and enables a more
streamlined passenger experience in the post-pandemic travel era. Along
with biometrics development, digital credentials, such as mobile
driver's licenses and digital passports, will become increasingly
common and will enable TSA to support a touchless experience at the
checkpoint. TSA must continue to partner actively with private
industry, NIST, and State DMV organizations to support the adoption of
common standards that will enable the integration of these technologies
at the screening checkpoint.
While biometrics have the potential to be a powerful tool in
security environments, TSA must continue to prioritize the protection
and appropriate use of passenger biometric and biographic data from
cybersecurity threats and potential misuses. Passengers who apply for
TSA PreCheck or Global Entry must be confident that their personal data
is always protected and only used for appropriate purposes.
pipelines and cybersecurity threats
TSA must also be able to confront significant cyber risks, as we
saw on May 7, 2021, when the Colonial Pipeline Company announced it
halted its pipeline operations due to a ransomware attack, cyber
intrusions into pipeline computer networks have the potential to
disrupt critical supplies of gasoline and other refined gasoline
products and negatively impact our National security, economy,
commerce, and well-being.
This attack on the Nation's pipeline systems is a warning about the
dangers of connecting critical infrastructure to the wider internet
without implementing the appropriate security measures. It also makes
clear how activities in cyber space can affect deadly outcomes in the
physical world, just as the cutting of fiber optic cables in the
physical world can have significant repercussions in cyber space.
The creation of the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security
Agency (CISA) was important for expanding the Department's cyber
capabilities while enhancing its ability to coordinate cybersecurity
efforts with TSA and other agencies across the Government. We must
continue to ensure that TSA and CISA have the resources and personnel
they need to both coordinate the cybersecurity of Government systems
and respond to large-scale attacks affecting private and public
entities.
In response to this cyber intrusion, TSA exercised its Aviation and
Transportation Security Act of 2001 (ATSA) authorities to strengthen
the cybersecurity and resilience of pipeline owners and operators by
issuing 2 Security Directives that were developed in close consultation
with owners and operators of pipeline facilities, CISA, and critical
interagency partners. The first Security Directive requires pipeline
operators to report cybersecurity incidents, assess their cybersecurity
posture, and transmit the results to TSA and CISA. The second Security
Directive requires TSA-designated critical pipelines to develop
cybersecurity contingency and recovery plans, carry out a cybersecurity
architecture design review, and implement specific mitigation measures
to protect against ransomware attacks and other known threats to
operational technology systems.
As these actions and the close partnership between TSA and CISA
highlight, it is a strength, not a weakness, that the Department is
responsible for addressing threats in both physical and cyber domains,
allowing for a unity of effort that can better address threats spanning
the cyber and physical worlds. Today's threats are rarely, if ever,
limited to either the physical or cyber worlds. The wide-spread
application of smart technologies to every aspect of our lives has
brought with them new capabilities and threats. Cyber attacks on
critical infrastructure have only served to highlight this sort of
threat.
Safeguarding the Nation's pipeline systems is a critical
undertaking and partnership for TSA and CISA that requires extensive
collaboration with pipeline owners and operators. This was not the
first cyber intrusion in our Nation to have a direct impact and
cybersecurity incidents affecting surface transportation systems
continue to be a growing and evolving threat.
domestic security threats
There is no clearer manifestation of the threat of domestic
terrorism than the events that unfolded on January 6. The January 6
assault on the Capitol demonstrated how unprepared we were for domestic
terrorism fueled by extreme ideologies and misinformation. The attack
offers lessons that are applicable to TSA and across the Department.
The vast majority of domestic terrorists in recent memory have used
the internet to consume and post their extremist views and connect with
a network that shares their ideology. We must work to ensure that
relevant intelligence information is properly shared, that the right
resources are in place to allow for rapid incident response, and that
lines of communication are effective.
More effective utilization of open-source intelligence will
increase our ability to circumvent a planned attack as well as study
the on-line behavior of anyone that espouses hateful philosophies. We
also need to do a better job of working with social media companies to
detect and handle extremist content while also remaining cognizant of
foreign actors that further spread disinformation through on-line
platforms. We also need to empower the Department to work with fusion
centers around the country on how to conduct thorough intelligence
analysis. State and local agencies are our first line of defense
against domestic extremists.
Finally, as we secure our Nation against domestic extremist
violence, we must not ignore the continuing threat of international
terrorism. Our departure from Afghanistan may embolden groups like
ISIS-K or al-Qaeda. Thus, we must continue to maintain and upgrade our
foreign intelligence collection capabilities and our border and
infrastructure security. We do not have the luxury of contending with
only one threat at a time. As President Biden has made clear, however,
we have the will and determination to defend against all these threats.
Michael Chertoff is the former Secretary of the U.S. Department of
Homeland Security (2004-2009) and now co-founder and executive chairman
of The Chertoff Group, a security and risk-management firm that has
clients and performs services for companies that manufacture biometric
and computed tomography X-ray systems.
______
Statement of Kip Hawley
September 29, 2021
Chairman Thompson, Ranking Member Katko, and distinguished Members
of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to contribute to this
hearing on the 20th anniversary of the creation of the Transportation
Security Administration.
It was my honor to participate in the start-up of TSA in 2001-2002
and serve as TSA administrator from 2005 until 2009. TSA's challenges
seem like they come at you from a firehose. Nonetheless, several issues
run consistently through TSA's existence and will greatly influence
TSA's future success. Here are ten.
10. Continued Vigilance & Evolving Threat
In the hectic days during fall 2001 when Congress created TSA,
nobody was predicting 20 years of safety from a catastrophic terror
attack. Attacks against us were in the planning stages and the
prevailing sentiment was that terror attacks were a question of
``when'' not ``if.'' By any standard, 20 years is a remarkable
milestone for TSA. A key success factor in counterterrorism is to fight
hard with a sense of urgency every day. Attacks are not beaten, they
are postponed. While 20 years is great, we must be mindful that
terrorism constantly changes across all its dimensions--people,
weapons, targets, ideology, etc. TSA must continue to design and
execute layered security measures that are capable of stopping attacks
that we know about and ones that may not yet have been conceived.
Focused, sustained effort pursued every day can lead to continued
future years of safety for the traveling public.
9. Regulatory DNA vs. Dynamic Risk Management
TSA was born out of the FAA and inherited many of its processes and
people. As a result, TSA has an institutional instinct to regulate--
write rules and then audit their performance. That makes risk
management sense if, as in aviation safety, the risk is static.
However, terror risk is dynamic and unpredictable. Confronting terror
risk with a checklist is a recipe for disaster. It is not easy to
balance the need for auditable accountability with the operational
necessity of having dynamic security measures. The VIPR program was a
successful example of maintaining accountability and structure in a
variety of transportation settings with effective, dynamic security
actions. With VIPR, different TSA disciplines came together as
temporary teams (Air Marshals, TSO's, Inspectors, K-9's) and popped up
in locations dictated by the latest security intelligence. VIPR
operations were unpredictable to terrorists and thus an effective
deterrent. If TSA operates according to a uniform game plan, then if
once a terrorist figures that out, the entire network is vulnerable.
TSA has been successful in using multiple layers spread throughout the
transportation environment. Like a safe combination, if a burglar
figures out one number, there are multiple other problems to crack.
In short, we identify innovative concepts and technology to stay
ahead of terrorist threats. It is a collaborative approach, especially
with our international partners, because the transportation system is a
global network where any weak link could be exploited. Connectedness is
an important security measure itself. We know that terrorists are
studying airport security around the world, trying to find ways to
attack, and we must be united in our commitment to keeping travelers
safe.
8. People
We pay for the most advanced technology on earth--the human brain--
and have it already deployed at every checkpoint in the country, for
that matter, everywhere there is a TSA person. We should get the most
out of that brainpower technology. Trained, empowered people are the
necessary foundation for a counterterrorism organization. My point
above about checklist mentality ties in here. We need to automate that
which can be reduced to binary decisions and take advantage of a well-
trained and motivated workforce to undertake the essential security
work that requires outthinking smart, dedicated terror operators. TSA's
workforce needs to be elite. TSA jobs need to be well-paid and
professionally demanding. And TSA's security processes need to be
designed to take full advantage of that workforce.
Intelligence and technology are critical to effective security, but
people were--and still are--TSA's strongest asset. Nothing can adapt
quicker to complex threats than the human mind. During my tenure, we
implemented pay increases for the front-line Transportation Security
Officer (TSO) workforce and developed a career path to increase
motivation and retention. Additional pay enhancements have been made
since I left TSA, but the starting salary for a TSO is still too low to
ensure they stay and grow in the agency. If TSA is to operate as a
world-class transportation security organization, the pay for the
people on the front lines has to improve to reflect the importance of
what they do, day in and day out. I hope Congress will continue to
support that.
The need to be elite extends up the leadership chain as well. We
need to make it more attractive to serve at TSA, and recruiting should
maintain a steady flow of a more diverse leadership team. There is
always room for more smart, committed people who want to serve the TSA
mission. We were lucky at the beginning of TSA when Secretary Norm
Mineta's courage and energy led the stand-up of TSA amid a very
tumultuous time. His deputy, Michael Jackson, had the professional
management skills needed to maneuver and sometimes bulldoze the way for
TSA to stand up on time. They had a rare combination of experience,
intelligence, stamina, confidence, and humility. Leaders like them do
not grow on trees but, if we look, we will find them.
7. Diversity and Combatting the Failure of Imagination
Diversity is a core foundational element of a sound security
system. A Standard Operating Procedure that covers every threat
imaginable becomes instantly useless the moment a terrorist devises a
threat that was not imagined. How to protect yourself against the
unimaginable? The power of diversity is a place to start. TSA needs
people of all backgrounds and experiences and those different voices
must be heard. TSA can be purposeful in its recruiting at all levels to
ensure a vibrant mix of talent. Diversity in people means that their
ideas will be diverse and, at TSA, means that security measures can be
innovative. The concept extends to technology, information sources, and
virtually every aspect of TSA's work. Protecting a huge network such as
our transportation system calls for constant innovation and diversity
is a necessary ingredient.
6. Federal Air Marshal Service (FAMS) & Flight Crews
The Federal Air Marshal Service is an essential part of TSA's
arsenal. We know that they are feared by terrorists and that they can
do their anti-hijacking job second to none in the world. Air Marshals
are so much more than that. I mentioned earlier the importance of well-
trained, highly-trained, and intelligent people. They are a flexible
force that can be used on the ground as with VIPRs, in airports or
transit systems undercover, with other agencies like the JTTF's, with
other nations as they work daily. That is the FAMS. After 9/11, I
remember a conversation with Norm Mineta in which he speculated on how
long a robust FAMS would last. There were 32 Air Marshals on 9/11. We
must not cut their capability because we don't see all they do for our
security.
Like you, I have seen news reports about passengers attacking
flight crew members recently. In the aftermath of 9/11, TSA pushed for
training for pilots and flight crews so that they could play an active
role should an attack happen, and the training was well-received. These
dedicated professionals are truly the last line of defense on a plane,
in addition to Federal Air Marshals, and they must be prepared for
potential attacks. Congress would be wise to continue investing in
programs to ensure they can protect the skies.
5. Trust
TSA must maintain the trust of the American people. Passengers
depend on TSA for their safety. Passengers who undergo all kinds of
inconvenience need to believe that it is for valid security purpose.
This partnership between TSA and the flying public is a vital component
of security because an active engaged public increases TSA's
effectiveness. TSA should ask only what is required for current
security needs. This is easy to say and hard to do. Too much change is
confusing and difficult to implement across the huge TSA network. We
can take this 20-year milestone as a point to streamline the checkpoint
process. I have written before about my concerns about PreCheck's
security vulnerabilities as well as its operational inefficiency. These
issues remain. Perhaps making the process smooth for everybody would
turbocharge the entire system. Yes, this would mean looking at
prohibited items like sharp objects and the liquid restrictions. Open
discussion with stakeholders like airlines, airports, flight crews, and
the public could strengthen the trust--and security effectiveness--
among all parties.
Another trust issue is privacy. We implemented Secure Flight in
2009 with a great deal of help from GAO. After some fumbles, we rebuilt
Secure Flight from scratch with privacy protections built in. I believe
that they are hard-wired. However, in today's world, privacy is more
and more difficult to protect and I urge TSA and Congress to keep a
close eye on the privacy promises made during Secure Flight's
inception. I have no reason to believe this is a problem, it is just
that all that data is so tempting to use for other purposes.
4. Technology
In 20 years we have gone from metal detectors and wands to almost
limitless capability. The problem has always been getting the right
technology onto the floor. CT is a good example of a technology that is
relatively inexpensive, easy to maintain, and very flexible. Software
upgrades can result in a step-up in capability that otherwise would
require buying an entirely new machine. Terrorists know where specific
technology is deployed because terrorists study the system and know
where specific technology is deployed. We are better off with a wide
deployment of CT than a spotty deployment of more sophisticated
technology.
TSA needs to open up its technology identification process. TSA has
relied on its own internal process to specify, identify, and procure
its technology. All in-house. This stands in the way of innovation. TSA
could benefit from the technology innovation processes at DoD, where
new technology is supported.
There needs to be some independent review of TSA's technology.
During my time at TSA, we required scanner manufacturers to separate
the hardware they built from the software they used to process images.
This allowed us to reduce purchasing costs and encouraged software
innovation. Further, we partnered with the National Science Labs at
Sandia, Lawrence Livermore, and Los Alamos to review our requirements
for the accuracy of scanners. The results, even from their early stage
review, were vital. Both programs were unfortunately discontinued. The
point is, with all the money TSA invests in technology, shouldn't there
be some independent review somewhere in the process? (See Diversity,
above.)
3. Intelligence
The Intelligence Community (IC) was critical during my time at TSA.
The DHS head of Intelligence, Charlie Allen, supported TSA by opening
doors within the IC, helped us hire into TSA and made sure we had full
independent access to critical information. This allowed TSA to make
connections that others had not made and on occasion, a TSA analyst had
a nugget published in the President's Daily Brief (PDB). This
independent analysis resulted in some friction but it made all of us
sharper and have a higher sense of urgency. For instance, TSA
implemented a total liquid ban in 4 hours when faced with a plot in
2006. We would not have been able to act as fast as we needed without
the intelligence access that TSA had at the time. There are many
examples of how TSA was able to take elements of intelligence reporting
and convert them within hours into effective security measures both in
the United States and abroad. A strong partnership with the IC and a
strong independent intel operation at TSA will help the agency focus
both on known and evolving threats.
2. Return on Investment.
Was it worth it? We have all been frustrated by TSA and that
constant irritant perhaps makes it difficult to see its big picture
value. Going back to my first point about Vigilance, 20 years is a long
time to withstand any kind of threat. The attacks on 9/11 and plots
like the 2009 Christmas Day bomber and foiled UK liquid explosive
attack are not top of mind for many people traveling through airports.
During my tenure alone, there were dozens of dangerous attack plans
that were broken up by colleagues in law enforcement, the intelligence
agencies, armed services, international and other partners working
together. I have no reason to believe that the threat has disappeared.
TSA's role is impossible to quantify, but it is a major player. What is
the value of flying safely in freedom for 20 years? Had there been
follow-on 9/11 attacks, would our economy have grown as it has? TSA has
cost somewhere around $100 billion and introduced unwelcome friction to
be sure. On balance though, I believe that TSA has carried its fair
share and then some.
TSA has made great strides in the past 20 years, thanks to the
support of Congress, strong leadership at DHS, and collaboration with
Federal agencies, international partners, and the private sector. We
have come a long way since 9/11, but there is more work to be done.
It has been the greatest honor of my life to serve alongside the
women and men of TSA. My profound thanks and great respect go out to
those who serve and continue to serve TSA and its mission. Not a day
goes by when I do not reflect on those who lost their lives on 9/11 and
those who answer the challenge to protect our country. As time passes,
it is ever more important to remember that 9/11 is not just a distant
moment in history, it is a charge to all of us to stand up and answer
our country's call.
1. Never Forget.
Mr. Katko. Thank you. It is impressive that we will hear
from 4 of the 7 Senate-confirmed TSA administrators. I want to
thank all of you for all you have done and continue to do in
keeping our country secure. As we approach TSA's 20th
anniversary on November 19, it is imperative that we now turn
our attention to how TSA should be positioned to counter new
and emerging threats, threats we couldn't conceive of in the
early days after 9/11.
I am extremely concerned that our withdrawal from
Afghanistan will create a new safe haven for terrorists. Our
homeland is again at risk with the rise of ISIS and al-Qaeda in
that region where they now once again have found a comfortable
home.
As terrorist threats continue to evolve, TSA needs to
accelerate its deployment of next generation technology and
biometrics to the checkpoint. We cannot delay these investments
or accept movement at a snail's pace, lest we risk being caught
flatfooted once again. These needed technologies include
credential authentication technology, computed tomography,
advanced imaging technology, stand-off detection, and so much
more.
TSA must be agile and ensure that its work force is
positioned to counter the evolving threats we will see over the
next 20 years. As former Administrator Kip Hawley said in his
statement for the record, ``Intelligence and technology are
critical to effective security, but people were and still are
TSA's strongest asset.''
I wholeheartedly agree, and I thank the employees of TSA
for their service to securing the Nation's transportation
systems. Their dedication has shown through as they have
continued to perform their critical duties in the midst of a
global pandemic.
Over 10,000 TSA employees have tested positive for COVID-19
and 29 have tragically died. I have spoken to Administrator
Pekoske, my friend, regularly regarding my concern that the
front-line TSA work force is not paid enough, and I know he
shares that concern. Transportation security officers have an
important job and their pay does not reflect it.
I have heard time and again that the pay issues are going
to be fixed, but they never are. I look forward to hearing from
Administrator Pekoske today on the details of the compensation
that he is providing to the front-line work force and what
Congress can do to support these pay initiatives.
As we reflect on the past 20 years of TSA and its 20 years
going forward, we must remember one thing, we must never, ever
forget.
With that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
[The statement of Ranking Member Katko follows:]
Statement of Ranking Member John Katko
Thank you, Chairman Thompson, for convening this important hearing
today.
On September 11, 2001, 19 hijackers proceeded through U.S. airport
security and, once on board, commandeered 4 commercial aircraft, flying
them into the World Trade Center in New York, the Pentagon, and a field
in Shanksville, Pennsylvania.
The Transportation Security Administration was created in the
months after the terrorist attacks and made dramatic changes to our
travel landscape.
Gone are the days when you could arrive for a flight minutes before
take-off or meet your arriving family members at their gate. But with
the immense help of the private sector, TSA quickly stood up and
established a robust aviation screening system. Our Nation is grateful.
Over the past 20 years, TSA has continuously adapted their
screening procedures based on critical intelligence and risk, while
also expanding its focus on securing surface transportation.
When our committee was in New York recently at the 9/11 Museum and
Memorial for the 20th anniversary of that terrible day in our Nation's
history, we all reflected on the nearly 3,000 Americans that died on 9/
11.
We didn't believe it was possible at the time, but TSA--and the
Department of Homeland Security--have been successful in preventing a
significant 9/11-style attack on our transportation system over the
last 20 years.
That's an amazing feat, and I want to keep it that way for the next
20 years. I know all the Members of the committee feel the same.
Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent to enter written testimonies
from former Secretary Chertoff and former Administrator Hawley into the
record. We appreciate their service, as well as the service of the
esteemed panelists who are here before the committee today.
It is impressive that we will hear from 4 of the 7 Senate-confirmed
TSA administrators. Thank you for all you have done and continue to do
in keeping our country secure.
As we approach TSA's 20th anniversary on November 19, it is
imperative that we now turn our attention to how TSA should be
positioned to counter new and emerging threats. Threats we couldn't
conceive of in the early days after 9/11.
I'm extremely concerned that our withdrawal from Afghanistan will
create a new safe haven for terrorists. Our homeland is again at risk
with the rise of ISIS and al-Qaeda in that region.
As terrorist threats continue to evolve, TSA needs to accelerate
its deployment of next-generation technology and biometrics to the
checkpoint. We cannot delay these investments or accept movement at a
snail's pace, lest we risk being caught flat-footed once again.
These needed technologies include credential authentication
technology, computed tomography, advanced imaging technology, stand-off
detection, and more.
TSA must be agile and ensure that its workforce is positioned to
counter the evolving threats we will see over the next 20 years.
As former Administrator Kip Hawley said in his statement for the
record, ``intelligence and technology are critical to effective
security, but people were--and still are--TSA's strongest asset.'' I
wholeheartedly agree and I thank the employees of TSA for their service
to securing the Nation's transportation systems.
Their dedication has shown through as they have continued to
perform their critical duties in the midst of a global pandemic. Over
10,000 TSA employees have tested positive for COVID-19 and 29 have
tragically died.
I've spoken to Administrator Pekoske regularly regarding my concern
that the front-line TSA workforce is not paid enough and I know he
shares that concern. Transportation Security Officers have an important
job and their pay does not reflect it.
I've heard time and time again that the pay issues are going to be
fixed but they never are. I look forward to hearing from Administrator
Pekoske today on the details of the compensation he is providing the
front-line workforce and what Congress can do to support these pay
initiatives.
As we reflect on the past 20 years of TSA and its next 20 years, we
must never forget.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Chairman Thompson. Other Members of the committee are
reminded that under committee rules, opening statements may be
submitted for the record. Members are also reminded that the
committee will operate according to the guidelines laid out by
the Chairman and Ranking Member in our February 3 colloquy
regarding remote proceedings.
I now welcome our panel of witnesses. Our first witness is
the Honorable David Pekoske, the current administrator of the
Transportation Security Administration, a position he has held
since 2017. In his role, he is responsible for overseeing the
execution of TSA's mission to secure the Nation's
transportation system and lead TSA's work force of more than
60,000 employees.
Prior to his time as TSA administrator, he spent 33 years
in the U.S. Coast Guard where he became the service's 26th Vice
Commandant in 2009. In addition, Mr. Pekoske was selected
earlier this year by President Biden to be the Acting Secretary
of Homeland Security ahead of Secretary Alejandro Mayorkas'
confirmation. I appreciate his willingness to appear on this
panel with former TSA administrators.
Our next witness is the Honorable Peter Neffenger who was
TSA administrator from 2015 to 2017 and is a retired vice
admiral in the U.S. Coast Guard.
Under his leadership, TSA developed its use of automated
screening technology, examined airport public area security,
and cultivated TSA's relationship with industry to resolve long
checkpoint delays at airports across the country.
Vice Admiral Neffenger is a 34-year veteran of the U.S.
Coast Guard where he served as the 29th vice commandant before
being nominated by President Barack Obama to be TSA
administrator.
Our third witness is the Honorable John S. Pistole, the TSA
administrator from 2010 to 2014. He is the president of
Anderson University, his alma mater, in Anderson, Indiana.
During his tenure at TSA, Mr. Pistole oversaw the creation
of the PreCheck program and was the first administrator to
grant TSA work force limited collective bargaining rights.
Prior to his position as administrator, Mr. Pistole spent 26
years with the Federal Bureau of Investigation where he led the
Counterterrorism Division following the attacks of 9/11. In
October 2004, he arose to the position of deputy director of
the FBI.
Our fourth witness, the Honorable James M. Loy, was the
second TSA administrator serving from 2002 to 2003. He came to
TSA from his position as commandant of the Coast Guard, the
role he was in on the day of the 9/11 attacks. As one of the
earliest leaders of TSA, he oversaw the launch of many of TSA's
operational activities and the hiring of tens of thousands of
newly-minted TSA employees. He later served as the deputy
secretary of Homeland Security under President George W. Bush,
capping off a career in public service spanning more than 4
decades.
Without objection, the witnesses' full statements will be
inserted in the record.
I now ask Administrator Pekoske to summarize his statement
for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF DAVID P. PEKOSKE, ADMINISTRATOR, TRANSPORTATION
SECURITY ADMINISTRATION
Mr. Pekoske. Chairman Thompson, Ranking Member Katko, and
distinguished Members of this committee, thank you for holding
this morning's hearing and for your comments in your opening
statements. I appreciate the opportunity to appear with 3
distinguished former administrators of TSA. They each continue
to make substantial contributions to our country and they are
all friends and colleagues. It has been my honor to build on
the foundation they established during their time leading TSA.
Each year, we remember the 9/11 attacks and the 2,977
people who perished. In our remembrance this year at TSA
Headquarters and the airports around the country our theme was
``United in Memory, Together in Mission''. I, like many of you,
remember that day as if it were yesterday, and in addition to
witnessing in horror the terrorist attacks carried out on our
homeland, I remember the way it felt to watch our country unite
behind a shared experience, and together commit to ``Never
Forget and Never Again''.
Our motto in TSA is ``Not on my watch''. In living this
motto, we must ensure that unity of effort and unity of purpose
so evident immediately following 9/11 continue to endure.
Approximately 2 months following 9/11, Congress passed the
Aviation and Transportation Security Act establishing TSA. In
that legislation and in our first major reauthorization just 3
years ago, you have provided us with the authorities needed to
protect the Nation's transportation systems.
The theme of this morning's hearing is the state of TSA 20
years after 9/11. In assessing the state of TSA, I would
respectfully submit that the state of TSA is very strong. We
continue to accomplish our mission in the face of threats to
our transportation system, both aviation and surface, and we
are achieving our vision to be an agile security agency
embodied by a professional work force that engages as partners
in the American people to outmatch a dynamic threat.
I would like to briefly highlight 3 elements of this
success: Agility, partnerships, and our people that are
particularly relevant to this hearing. First agility. The
intelligence community's work in assessing threats has allowed
us to mitigate risks to aviation and surface transportation. We
have rapidly changed our procedures in domestic airports and at
last-point-of-departure international airports based on
intelligence community assessments ensure this information
rapidly as appropriate with our partners.
Thanks to your support, we are in the midst of a major
upgrade to the technology in our screening checkpoints at over
400 airports around the country. These upgrades include
improved passenger identify verification and screening through
the use of credential authentication technology, improved
carry-on bag screening using computed tomography, or CT, X-ray
technology, and soon improved on-person screening through
upgraded advanced imaging technology.
The net result of all these advancements is twofold:
Significantly enhanced security effectiveness and an improved
passenger experience. I thank you for your support of these
technology improvements. They are critical to our continued
success.
Additionally, exercising the agility you have provided in
law, we have recently issued security directives to improve
cybersecurity in our Nation's most critical gas and hazardous
liquid pipelines, and we plan to expand this cybersecurity
effort to include all critical transportation security
infrastructure.
The second key element of success is partnerships. We have
outstanding partnerships with other Federal agencies as well as
our partners in State, local, Tribal, and territorial
governments. Similarly, we have worked very closely with our
international partners to ensure global aviation security,
especially at last-point-of-departure airports.
I appreciate your support of our one-stop security efforts
to enable us the pilot security equivalency at select
international locations. This will improve aviation security. I
am very proud of the partnerships we have with the aviation and
surface transportation owners and operators. This model of
engagement has allowed us to improve security at a pace and
level of sophistication that would not otherwise be possible.
And with that, the security and convenience benefits to
passengers who use these systems every day.
Without question, a key element of our success is our
people, and I couldn't be prouder of the people who serve their
country in TSA. They professionally ensure secure travel to
millions of people every single day. I have worked tirelessly
to earn their trust and provide the support and guidance they
need to accomplish our critical mission. I continue to strongly
support adjustments to pay for all of our people, especially
our front-line workers.
Regarding our screening work force in particular, I would
add 2 additional comments. We have already transitioned to
adverse action appeals to the Merit Systems Protection Board
and very shortly I will sign a new directive providing full
collective bargaining rights.
In conclusion, we are united in memory, together in
mission. I thank each Member of this committee for your support
of TSA and the opportunity to testify this morning, and I look
forward to your comments and questions. Thank you, Mr.
Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Pekoske follows:]
Prepared Statement of David P. Pekoske
September 29, 2021
Good morning Chairman Thompson, Ranking Member Katko, and
distinguished Members of the committee. I am honored to appear before
you today to recognize the 20th anniversary of the Transportation
Security Administration (TSA) and share our progress and substantial
accomplishments over the last 20 years.
September 11, 2001 is one of the darkest days in our Nation's
history. Even still, the American people emerged from these horrific
events more united than ever. In the aftermath of that dreadful day,
TSA was created to safeguard the United States against another 9/11-
type attack by strengthening the security of our Nation's
transportation systems while also ensuring freedom of movement for
people and commerce.
founding and congressional support
TSA was established by the Aviation and Transportation Security Act
(ATSA), which was signed into law on November 19, 2001. With the
enactment of ATSA, TSA assumed the significant challenge of protecting
our Nation's transportation systems from terrorist threats. There was
no blueprint for this urgent and immense task. The early leaders of TSA
built the organization 1 day at a time, initiating valuable
relationships with international, industry, Governmental, and private-
sector partners.
The agency was created to oversee security in all modes of
transportation, but aviation security was at the forefront of the
Nation's mind after the 9/11 attack. ATSA required TSA to deploy
Federal security screeners to inspect airline passengers, their
baggage, and air cargo; expanded the Federal Air Marshal Service; and
required reinforced cockpit doors among many things designed to enhance
transportation security. Additionally, the Implementing Recommendations
of the
9/11 Commission Act (9/11 Act) required TSA to implement the
recommendations of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon
the United States, such as requiring 100 percent air cargo screening on
passenger aircraft departing the country. Finally, through the TSA
Modernization Act of 2018 (TSA Mod Act), the agency's first
comprehensive reauthorization since its inception, TSA was further
authorized to expand field operational testing of advanced screening
technologies, increase the usage of canine resources, enhance public
area security, and improve the security of passengers, cargo, cockpits,
cabins, surface transportation, and foreign airports.
This November, TSA will mark 20 years since its formation. TSA's
mission and focus began with the urgent task of preventing another 9/
11-style attack on the homeland, but its operations have expanded and
evolved across the entire transportation landscape, from aviation to
surface and the physical and cyber domains. As we approach this
milestone, Congress' continued support remains essential to ensure TSA
can respond to this dynamic threat landscape, and I am committed to
working with you to ensure TSA has the authorities and resources needed
to both respond to emerging threats and support its workforce.
changing threat landscape
TSA's mandate is not only to mitigate the threats of today but to
preempt evolving threats as our adversaries continue to adapt and
evolve their tactics and methods. In the 2000's, we witnessed hijackers
using planes as weapons, and we saw unique methods in attempts to
conceal explosives in items like shoes, underwear, and soft drinks. In
the 2010's, we witnessed explosives hidden in electronics and attacks
on the public side of the airport. Now, in the 2020's, we face new and
extremely sophisticated threats from state and non-state actors,
ranging from cyber attacks to concerns about hostile and non-hostile
unmanned aircraft systems (UAS), in addition to traditional threats.
From January 2018 through August 2021, there were 2,476 UAS events
reported to TSA affecting all modes of transportation. From the
beginning of 2021 through the end of August, there has been a 169
percent increase in UAS sightings in the domestic aviation environment,
requiring 31 aircraft evasive actions. We are not only focused on
elaborate plots and large-scale attacks but also on current threats,
which could come from domestic violent extremists as well as insiders.
While the threat landscape has grown more complicated over the years,
one thing has not changed--we still face ambitious adversaries who are
intensely focused on finding a point of attack and waiting for
opportunity.
We have also faced another unprecedented and unexpected adversary--
a global pandemic. If COVID-19 has taught us anything, it is that we
must remain vigilant and adapt quickly, because not all threats look
the same. And just like 9/11, the COVID-19 pandemic will have a lasting
impact on the future of transportation.
Fortunately, agility is part of our DNA. When TSA was created, it
was done with the express purpose of forming an entrepreneurial agency
that could remain nimble in its approach to protecting our Nation's
transportation systems. From the beginning, our work force has been
taught to anticipate and prepare for the unexpected. When our officers
report to the checkpoint each day, the only thing they know for sure is
that the upcoming day will be different than the one before. That
mentality extends to the top of the organization, where our leaders
know that our adversaries are still committed to doing us harm, and we
must remain vigilant, innovative, and agile.
Today, TSA relies on intelligence to develop and implement its
approach to security and works closely with transportation, law
enforcement, and intelligence partners to set the international
standard for excellence in transportation security. Since the agency's
formation, TSA has implemented a robust series of security procedures,
developed a workforce well-trained in threat mitigation, and sought and
implemented state-of-the-art technologies to screen passengers,
baggage, and air cargo. The agency's security measures are continually
evaluated and enhanced by experts to address evolving threats,
including those potentially emanating from air cargo, while preserving
individual rights and freedoms. TSA is developing an Air Cargo Security
Roadmap, which is a strategic plan drafted in collaboration with key
industry and other Federal partners with equity in air cargo. The
Roadmap will outline TSA's strategic direction toward modernizing,
streamlining, and further securing the air cargo ecosystem over the
next 5 years.
While TSA is best known for aviation security, it also plays a key
role in protecting the Nation's surface transportation networks--mass
transit and passenger rail, freight rail, highway and motor carrier,
pipeline, and maritime. Following the Colonial Pipeline ransomware
incident, TSA helped lead the Department's efforts to improve baseline
cybersecurity requirements for the pipeline sector through the issuance
of two Security Directives. These directives are complementary to the
TSA and CISA efforts in the Pipeline Cybersecurity Initiative. TSA,
along with CISA, Coast Guard, and interagency stakeholders, continues
to identify opportunities to use existing authorities and private-
sector relationships to improve cybersecurity and information sharing
across all modes of transportation. We actively work across all surface
modes to enhance intelligence information sharing with our partners so
we can collaboratively address security issues unique to the mode of
transportation, such as the Surface Transportation Security Advisory
Committee (STSAC) recommendation to stand up a Surface Information
Sharing Cell. The tremendous challenge of protecting our Nation's
surface transportation systems and pipeline security infrastructure
from physical and cyber-based threats is not new; and it will continue
to be one of the most persistent threats in the future. To that end, in
September 2020, the TSA Security Training Rule, a 9/11 Act requirement,
became effective. This regulation, which had been in the rulemaking
process for many years, requires owners/operators of higher-risk
freight railroad carriers, public transportation agencies (including
rail mass transit and bus systems), passenger railroad carriers and
over-the-road bus companies to provide TSA-approved security training
to employees who perform security-sensitive functions. Additionally,
TSA is currently drafting a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking for the
vetting of front-line public transportation and railroad surface
transportation employees.
our workforce
Over the last 20 years, TSA's workforce has become an extremely
professional, highly-skilled, and proactive workforce of approximately
60,000 people. I am appreciative of and remain committed to the TSA
workforce, and am proud of everything the agency has accomplished
because of their efforts. I consider it a great privilege to serve
alongside such a dedicated group of individuals. We continue to see
tremendous efforts by our front-line screening officers, Federal Air
Marshals, inspectors, canine handlers, vetting personnel, and all of
those who support TSA's mission.
While the COVID-19 pandemic has tested our resiliency, TSA has
adapted and maintained its security posture while also working to
ensure the health and safety of both our employees and the traveling
public. This has been accomplished through distributing critical
personal protective equipment, adjusting procedures to accommodate
social distancing, and integrating of technologies that decrease the
need for touch points between officers, passengers, and their property.
TSA also issued and subsequently extended mask requirements in U.S.
transportation systems until January 18, 2022. Effective Friday,
September 10, 2021, TSA increased the range of civil penalties that may
be charged against individuals who violate this Federal mask mandate in
U.S. transportation systems. The new range of penalties will be $500-
$1,000 for first offenders and $1,000-$3,000 for second offenders.
TSA is also investing in its workforce by working to address long-
standing workforce challenges, which were highlighted in the Blue
Ribbon Panel of public and private sector human capital experts I
commissioned in 2018. Pursuant to its ATSA authorities, TSA has
developed 3 initiatives to enhance TSA officer compensation and make
career progression more transparent: Service Pay, Career Progression,
and Model Officer Recognition. Service Pay provides a predictable
annual salary increase that acknowledges enhanced experience and skill
mastery. The next phase of Career Progression, being implemented this
year, will provide a one-time pay increase for eligible E-Band officers
who successfully complete certain advanced skills training and take on
additional responsibilities. Finally, the Model Officer Recognition
program identifies and rewards TSA's top officers in all pay bands with
monetary and non-monetary awards or pay increases for their on-going
contributions to the mission. We are also leveraging funding to launch
efforts to recruit new employees in support of screening operations at
many of TSA's approximately 430 Federalized airports Nation-wide. We
will continue to pursue focused veteran and military recruitment and
outreach to help fill these and other important positions. Finally, TSA
is committed to workforce protections, expanding collective bargaining
at the National level, and ensuring that TSA's standards and processes
adhere to the principles applied by the Merit Systems Protection Board.
TSA continues to review options within existing authorities to achieve
these goals and expand items covered by the collective bargaining
agreement.
Historically, TSA employees have received limited pay progression
due to budget constraints. Recent initiatives such as Transportation
Security Officer (TSO) Service Pay and TSO Career Progression have,
however, increased compensation to compensate TSA employees at a level
more commensurate with the tremendous responsibility they bear for the
security of our transportation system.
TSA is committed to fostering a fair and equitable workplace and
fostering diversity and inclusion at all levels of the organization,
including within many of our highest-ranking positions. To achieve
this, TSA formed an Inclusion Action Committee (IAC) devoted to
strengthening our diversity and sustaining an inclusive culture to
further empower and engage our employees. Consistent with President
Biden's Executive Order on Preventing and Combatting Discrimination on
the Basis of Gender Identity or Sexual Orientation, and based on an IAC
recommendation, TSA issued a Management Directive and accompanying
Handbook in April 2021. This guidance provides policy and procedures
for addressing the needs and issues that arise for transitioning and
transgender TSA officers, as well as TSA's equal opportunity and
nondiscrimination policy as it relates to these employees and
applicants for employment. TSA is at its best when all employees feel
valued and are fully engaged to outmatch dynamic threats, committed
adversaries, and evolving circumstances.
evolution of airport security & screening
TSA's airport screening process is intelligence-driven and applies
a risk-based strategy that establishes security practices to expedite
screening for known and trusted travelers at security checkpoints while
focusing resources on high-risk and unknown passengers. TSA screens
more than 1 million passengers daily, on average, and more than 2
million daily before the COVID-19 pandemic through TSA's Secure Flight
passenger vetting system, introduced in 2009.
TSA's security strategy also includes other vetting activities. To
address risks associated with Insider Threats, TSA vets more than 25
million transportation workers daily against the Terrorist Watchlist,
including airport workers, airline flight crewmembers, mariners,
commercial drivers who haul hazardous materials, and cargo screeners
and handlers. In December 2020, TSA established the TSA Insider Threat
Mitigation Hub to mature and expand the capabilities of the Insider
Threat Program to enhance the ability to deter, detect, and mitigate
insider threats to transportation. TSA also vets students who enroll in
training through FAA-certified flight training providers and the entire
Airman Registry against changes or updates to the Terrorist Watchlist.
To improve the vetting process, TSA has implemented the Federal Bureau
of Investigation (FBI) recurrent criminal history vetting service known
as ``Rap Back'' to provide near real-time updates to an aviation
worker's criminal history, representing a significant improvement to
threat mitigation. With all of our screening and vetting programs, we
work to ensure that there are appropriate redress mechanisms in place
to ensure the protection of travelers' civil rights and civil
liberties.
TSA also works closely with its international partners to share
best practices, techniques, and technologies, and to collaborate and
facilitate measures to harmonize mutual aviation security goals for the
safety of travelers. Air cargo is more secure than it has ever been
with 100 percent of cargo on flights departing U.S. airports to
international locations screened or secured, consistent with the
International Civil Aviation Organization's (ICAO's) updated standards.
TSA also established the Third-Party Canine-Cargo (3PK9-C) program to
enhance the screening of air cargo by leveraging the capabilities of
third-party explosives detection canine teams.
technology advancements
Since TSA's inception, we have continuously refined our security
approach by examining the procedures and technologies we use to secure
our Nation's transportation systems. The introduction of new
technologies has played a significant role in how airport security has
evolved and been enhanced over the past 20 years as industry develops
new methods to help TSA detect threats to the aviation sector. As we
look to the future, TSA strives to remain the recognized global leader
of transportation security by focusing on capability innovation and
threat-informed, information-driven operations. A number of improved
technologies and enhancements that TSA has recently introduced provide
significant advancements over existing equipment used for identity
verification and the screening of individuals and their accessible
property while also reducing contact during screening to improve the
passenger experience. These key technologies include:
Computed Tomography, or CT, which produces high-quality 3-D
images that can be rotated up to 360 degrees on three axes for
a more thorough visual analysis of a carry-on bag's contents.
It also reduces the need to touch or manually check bags.
Credential Authentication Technology, or CAT, machines
automatically verify identification documents presented by
passengers during the security screening process and confirm a
passenger's flight information and vetting status without the
need for our officers to see a boarding pass. TSA has worked to
modify CAT machines to allow self-service operation, so
passengers can scan their own photo ID without our Officers
touching the document. Additionally, the Self-Service CAT with
camera (CAT-2) upgrade units promote social distancing, reduce
the need for a physical ID handoff at the Travel Document
Checker (TDC), and make passenger screening more automated.
Advanced Imaging Technology, or AIT, safely screens
passengers for both metallic and non-metallic threats such as
weapons and explosives without physical contact. Enhancements
have reduced the number of false alarms at the checkpoint by
using even more sophisticated millimeter wave technology.
biometrics and identity management
In addition to new and improved screening technologies, we are also
investing in biometric technology, which adds an important layer to our
security procedures. Biometrics are a powerful tool, such as to improve
identity verification performance, but must be used carefully and with
the utmost respect and safeguarding of passenger privacy. In our
pilots, testing protocols always use a voluntary process for passengers
choosing to go through using the biometric technology in addition to
conducting passenger surveys about our technologies and their use.
TSA's CAT-2 uses facial matching technology that compares the live
image of a passenger with the image on the passenger's photo ID, never
stores biometric information, and any information captured for one
passenger is deleted by the time the next passenger approaches. TSA
remains mindful that biometric systems may have error rates and tests
such systems to ensure accurate performance across diverse demographic
groups. A recently concluded DHS Science and Technology Directorate
(DHS S&T) test of the CAT-2 devices for match performance across
demographic groups concluded that ``no consistent statistically
significant differences in performance across gender, race, and skin
tone were observed across test conditions for the CAT-2 system.''
Maintaining passenger equitability and dignity is an agency priority
and new technologies, like CAT-2, should enhance both transportation
security and the passenger experience.
Along with biometrics development, digital credentials, such as
mobile driver's licenses and digital passports, are becoming
increasingly common. Mobile driver's license technology can enable a
more seamless airport security screening experience for travelers and
TSA is working with industry and the public to find innovative ways
mobile driver's licenses can facilitate easier and faster transit
through TSA checkpoints while complying with REAL ID Act of 2005
requirements, enforcement of which was extended until May 3, 2023, due
to the COVID-19 pandemic. Mobile driver's license technology marks a
major milestone for TSA to provide an additional level of convenience
for the traveler by enabling more opportunities for touchless TSA
airport security screening. Moving forward, TSA will continue to pursue
innovative solutions that allow us to improve identity management while
ensuring privacy and mitigating any potential risks that these new
technologies may introduce. Technology advancements are just one part
of TSA's multi-layered approach to ensuring transportation security.
partnerships
Protecting our Nation's transportation systems requires robust
partnerships and effective security operations across all modes of
transportation. Similar to other security efforts, TSA considers
engaging public and private partners vital to ensuring the safety and
security of our transportation network. Due to our expansive scope of
operation and influence, TSA works with: Owners and operators of
transportation systems, industry associations, manufacturers, advisory
bodies (e.g., Aviation Security Advisory Committee and STSAC), Critical
Infrastructure Government and Sector Coordinating Councils under the
National Infrastructure Protection Plan, and other Government and
quasi-Governmental agencies (e.g., ICAO).
We are also extremely cognizant of the needs of passengers that use
the transportation systems. TSA's Disability and Multicultural
Coalition alone coordinates with over 450 advocacy and community-based
organizations representing diverse communities. Additionally, we
continue to expand our cadre of Passenger Support Specialists to
provide real-time support in successfully engaging with and screening
our diverse traveler populations. The TSA Mod Act also advanced our
partnerships in this area. We appreciate Congress' direction as TSA
continues to foster a culture that treats all passengers with dignity
and respect.
TSA has always welcomed and actively pursued engagement and
alignment with our partners, and we have always worked together toward
our mutual objectives of keeping passengers, cargo, and goods secure
while also ensuring a positive travel experience. We rely on our
partnerships to help secure the National transportation system and will
continue to develop them in the years ahead to enhance security across
the whole of the surface transportation enterprise.
closing
Chairman Thompson, Ranking Member Katko, and Members of the
committee, I appreciate this opportunity, on the occasion of TSA's 20th
anniversary, to share the significant steps the agency has taken to
meet the challenges of the ever-evolving security threat landscape. Our
homeland is stronger today than it was 20 years ago, and I am extremely
proud of the hard work and achievements we have made since our
founding. Today, I reaffirm our commitment to transportation security
and assure you that we remain steadfast in our mission to protect the
Nation's transportation systems and ensure the freedom of movement for
people and commerce. Thank you for your continued support of TSA's
mission and the chance to appear before you today. I look forward to
answering any questions you may have.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you very much. I now ask Admiral
Neffenger to summarize his statement for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF PETER V. NEFFENGER, PRIVATE CITIZEN, FORMER
ADMINISTRATOR, TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION
Mr. Neffenger. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and good morning to
you, Ranking Member Katko, and the distinguished Members of
this committee. Thank you for inviting me to join my
distinguished colleagues and my good friends in recognizing the
20th anniversary of the TSA and to reflect upon what is the
unique value and critically important service it provides to
our Nation.
Transportation underpins our economic health, is essential
to our prosperity and resilience, and is a key component of our
National security, and one of the greatest privileges of my
career was to have served with the women and men of the TSA.
They are among the most dedicated, professional, and selfless
public servants I have known, and our Nation is safer and more
secure because of their work, and I remain grateful for their
service.
TSA's missions encompasses the full spectrum of our
Nation's transportation system: Aviation, maritime, mass
transit, passenger and freight rail, over-the-road motor
carriers, interstate pipelines, and more. It is an
extraordinarily dynamic and complex mission set made even more
so by a continually evolving and expanding threat environment.
Transportation security today is a direct outgrowth, as we have
heard, of the tragic attacks of September 11, the 20th
anniversary of which we sadly commemorated this month.
Transportation was the weapon of 9/11 and it offered the
means and the instruments for terrorists to strike at America.
This hearing has recounted the history of our Nation's actions
and successes since that tragic event and has already
highlighted TSA's many accomplishments. My colleagues will also
describe in chilling detail the diversity of new threats we
face. Building upon this, I will add some thoughts looking
forward.
We are safer and more secure because of the security
architecture we have built over the past 20 years. We have
developed more capable systems and technologies. We have
integrated and shared intelligence among many stakeholders. We
have designed processes and procedures for vetting people who
access or work in critical areas. We have developed tactics and
techniques to prevent large-scale attacks like 9/11 from
happening again.
We have become exceptionally adept at instituting
countermeasures to the terrorist tactics we have seen and
experienced, and such countermeasures are essential. Security
is necessarily additive as terrorists and criminals rarely
remove a tool from their kit.
However, today's security systems, as good as they are, are
not sufficient for tomorrow's threats. Adversaries are agile,
adaptive, aggressive, and creative. We have to be even more so.
There is no perfect system, no ideal technology, and no we got
it right moment. Success demands systems and technologies that
are adaptive, innovative, and focused on imagining what might
happen in addition to protecting against what has happened, and
that imagination is key.
Terrorists and criminals are dangerous entrepreneurs,
always seeking advantage and ever poised to exploit
vulnerabilities. These include increasingly sophisticated,
interdependent cyber systems, the shocking lessons of the
global COVID-19 pandemic, vulnerabilities presented by
interconnected industrial control systems, and the growing
sophistication and deployment of technologies such as unmanned
systems and autonomous vehicles.
Moreover, barriers to entry continue to lower, especially
with respect to cyber. The Colonial Pipeline ransomware attack
and the hacking of a major U.S. maritime port just last week
dramatically illustrate the ease with which critical
infrastructure can be attacked and disabled by remote cyber
actors. Administrator Pekoske has presented a compelling
strategy for investment in the TSA work force, including
increasing pay and evolving and modernizing TSA's systems and
architecture.
The TSA Innovation Task Force and the Office of
Requirements and Capabilities Analysis are working hard to
imagine future threats to innovate faster than our adversaries,
but their work requires predictable, stable, and reliable
funding and support to succeed, and I urge this committee and
Congress to fully fund TSA's strategy to ensure they will
continue to evolve faster than the threats we envision.
I also urge you to support efforts to mature research and
development efforts across DHS to include robust private-sector
engagement and open architecture standards; coordinated, on-
going, operationally-focused, and integrated R&D is fundamental
to counter future threats. Security is a never-ending race and
we need to stay in the lead.
I thank this committee for your continued and steadfast
support of the TSA over the years and for support of its
dedicated work force, and I look forward to your comments and
any questions you may have. Thank you again, Mr. Chairman and
Ranking Member Katko and distinguished Members.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Neffenger follows:]
Prepared Statement of Peter V. Neffenger
September 29, 2021
Chairman Thompson, Ranking Member Katko, and distinguished Members
of the committee, thank you for inviting me here today to add my
thoughts to those of my former colleagues as we recognize the 20th
anniversary of the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) and
reflect upon the unique value and critically important service it
provides to our Nation.
One of greatest privileges of my career was to have had the honor
of serving with the women and men of the TSA. They are among the most
dedicated, professional, and selfless public servants I have known, and
our Nation is safer and more secure because of their work. I remain
grateful for their service.
Most Americans know TSA as the agency responsible for aviation
security. But as this committee well knows, TSA's missions are many and
encompass the full spectrum of our Nation's transportation system--
aviation, maritime, mass transit, passenger and freight rail, over-the-
road motor carriers, interstate pipelines, and more. It is a dynamic
mission set that is extraordinarily complex, comprehensive, and
challenging, made ever more so by a continually evolving and expanding
threat environment. And today's threat environment is much more
dynamic, diverse, and complex than the one faced when TSA came into
being on November 19, 2001.
The transportation network underpins our Nation's economic health.
It enables reliable access to materials and markets and the ability to
take advantage of economies of scale and production. Transportation is
central to our economic prosperity and resilience, and transportation
security is a key component of our National security. We've lived
through devasting impacts to our lives and economy when transportation
systems have been disrupted or compromised. Indeed, as we meet here
today, our supply chains face severe challenges in part due to the
transportation disruptions of the global COVID pandemic.
Our current approach to transportation security is a direct
outgrowth of the tragic attacks of September 11, 2001--the 20th
anniversary of which we sadly commemorated by remembering those we lost
and honoring the heroes who responded. Transportation provided the
weapon of 9/11 and was central to al-Qaeda's strategy that day.
Transportation offered the means and the instruments for terrorists to
strike at America. Transportation also provided the mechanism for the
19 hijackers to travel and coordinate their plot.
My colleagues on this panel have recounted the history of our
collective actions and successes in the 2 decades following that tragic
event and have specifically highlighted the many accomplishments of TSA
to date and suggested approaches for the future. They have also
described in chilling detail the challenging and diverse array of new
threats facing our Nation. Building upon this, I will focus my comments
on transportation security looking forward.
The robust and capable security architecture we have built over the
past 20 years has arguably made us safer and more secure from terrorist
attacks. We have developed more capable systems and technologies,
integrated and shared intelligence among stakeholders, designed
processes and procedures for vetting people who access or work in
critical areas, and developed tactics and techniques to prevent large-
scale attacks like 9/11 from happening again. We have become
exceptionally adept at instituting countermeasures to the terrorist
tactics we have seen and experienced. Such countermeasures are
essential. Security is necessarily additive, as terrorists and
criminals have not been known to remove a tool from their kit.
However, a security system that is primarily reactive is a security
system that can, and will, eventually fail. Adversaries are agile,
adaptive, aggressive, and creative. Our approaches to security must be
even more so. Effective and capable security systems are dynamic and
ever-evolving. There is no perfect system nor ideal technology and no
``we got it right'' moment. Success demands security systems and
technologies that anticipate and predict--systems that are creative,
adaptive, and innovative, and that focus on imagining what might happen
in addition to protecting against what has happened.
Imagining what might happen is key, as the transportation threat
picture presents in a multitude of new and ever-changing configurations
and pathways. Terrorists and criminals are dangerous entrepreneurs
searching for advantage. In addition to the on-going, persistent threat
from direct attacks, we are subject to growing array of new perils and
concerns. These include increasingly sinister and sophisticated cyber
actors; the shock and lessons of a global pandemic and its impact on
global transportation; vulnerabilities presented by our reliance on
increasingly interconnected industrial control systems; and the growing
sophistication and deployment (and inherent vulnerabilities) of
technologies such as unmanned systems and autonomous vehicles.
Moreover, the barriers to entry for those who would attack or harm
continue to lower, especially with respect to cyber threats. The
Colonial Pipeline ransomware attack and the hacking of a major U.S.
maritime port just last week dramatically illustrate the ease with
which our critical infrastructure can be attacked and disabled by
remote cyber actors.
For these reasons and more, the transportation security systems of
today cannot be the transportation security systems of tomorrow.
Today's state-of-the-art systems, as good as they may be, will not be
sufficient to meet tomorrow's threats. We need the resolve and courage
to dedicate the resources and build the integrated systems necessary to
imagine the next threats and continually refresh and refine our
training, technologies, and processes to evolve faster than the threats
we foresee.
Administrator Pekoske has presented a compelling strategy and
persuasive argument for increasing investment in the TSA workforce and
in continually evolving, improving, and modernizing TSA's systems and
architecture. But this strategy requires predictable and reliable
funding and support to succeed. For example, the TSA Innovation Task
Force and the TSA Office of Requirements and Capabilities are working
hard to imagine future threats and innovate faster than our
adversaries. They are rapidly developing, testing, and deploying
systems and processes to front-line operators to counter the threats of
the future. I urge this committee and Congress to fully fund TSA's
strategy road map along with programs such as these that encourage
rapid innovation, provide for continuous technology improvements and
deployment, and give the workforce the tools and training they need.
I also urge you to support efforts to further mature research and
development efforts across the DHS enterprise. Coordinated, on-going,
operationally-focused, and integrated research and development across
DHS can provide TSA and other agencies with the capabilities they need
to counter the complexity and diversity of evolving threats, foreign
and domestic. Such work should be linked to intelligence assessments
and a detailed requirements and capabilities development process with
robust private-sector engagement, input from partners and stakeholders,
open architecture standards, and acquisition strategies and processes
that promote rapid deployment of new technologies across the full
spectrum of the mission set.
Security is a never-ending race, and we need to stay in the lead.
Chairman Thompson, Ranking Member Katko, and Members of the
committee, thank you again for this chance to share my thoughts as we
mark TSA's 20th anniversary. Thank you for your continued support of
the TSA and its dedicated workforce. I look forward to any questions
you may have.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you very much. I now ask Mr.
Pistole to summarize his statement for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF JOHN S. PISTOLE, PRESIDENT, ANDERSON UNIVERSITY,
FORMER ADMINISTRATOR, TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION
Mr. Pistole. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is good to see
you, sir, and Ranking Member Katko. Just a personal note, I
happened to be in your district on 9/11 20 years ago doing FBI
audit and inspection. I was in the Federal courthouse when the
planes hit there, so. Also thank you to the rest of the Members
of the committee and to the professional staff who make this
hearing possible.
I just have 3 points I would like to make, Mr. Chairman and
Ranking Member Katko. First, I strongly encourage you and the
administration to continue support for the broad authorities
for the TSA administrator, which each of the other former
administrators and current Administrator Pekoske have exercised
judicially.
Just a couple of examples, one from a threat perspective
and one from an innovation perspective that I experienced in my
4\1/2\ years as the administrator. One, we are all well
familiar with the October 2010 AQAP toner cartridge plot out of
Yemen where two toner cartridge bombs were being sent from
Sana'a, Yemen, to Chicago. That plot was foiled by just great
intelligence, so it wasn't because of great screening. That
actually came from the White House and Deputy National Security
Advisor, at the time, John Brennan, before he went to the CIA,
working with the head of the Ministry of Interior of the
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, and then the chief counsel at both TSA
and the Department of Homeland Security Office of Security
Operations and International Affairs, along with the FBI, CIA,
and State Department, and, of course, all of those at DHS
Headquarters.
I was able to issue emergency amendments which literally
barred any and all cargo from being shipped from Yemen to the
United States. There are a number of ramifications and
unattended consequences of that action, but it kept future
bombs from being shipped to the United States.
Second, on the innovation aspect of the broad authorities,
with the terrific senior leadership team that I inherited at
TSA and great support from then Secretary of Homeland Security
Janet Napolitano and CBP Commissioner Alan Bersin, we
envisioned and launched the TSA PreCheck program, which is, of
course, now a popular Trusted Traveler program with nearly 11
million people enrolled in addition to those who do dual
enrollment from CBP's Global Entry program, a hugely successful
Trusted Traveler program for international travelers.
So thank you to Chairman Thompson and other Members of the
committee who had the foresight in crafting legislation
initially standing up TSA, to provide those authorities because
it gave me the opportunity to take immediate action to
mitigate, No. 1, a clear and present danger, and then also to
implement a risk-based security initiative to facilitate
smooth, safe travel for millions of law-abiding citizens and to
move, as you said, Mr. Chairman, from a one-size-fits-all to
risk-based security approaches.
Second, I would encourage you and the entire committee to
support the TSA work force that has been articulated by
Administrator Pekoske, especially the front-line TSOs. Better
pay is the key issue and there is--I am heartened by some of
the efforts being made to improve the pay whether that means
moving the work force to the GS pay system under Title 5 or
other initiatives. I think that is an important thing to do.
Let me just make a comment on the collective bargaining
since I was the administrator who issued that determination to
allow for a modified form of collective bargaining. I think
AFGE on the union representing the TSOs has done a good job of
representing them in this unique, non-traditional collective
bargaining agreement. Both the chief counsel of TSA, Francine
Kerner, and the general counsel for AFGE, David Bore, they are
the two constants over the last 10 years since I issued the
determination who provided great legal advice, context, and
clarity as moving forward.
Then third is that I support and encourage what my two
successors have done in terms of innovation because we know
innovation doesn't happen in a vacuum. It is really just a
couple of points there, through investment and key technologies
and processes, and then the partnerships, which the current
administrator has mentioned; partnerships with the private
sector so they are incentivized to do the R&D to deploy NextGen
technology today, tomorrow, and for years to come.
So, obviously, partnerships with you, Mr. Chairman, and
Ranking Member Katko and OMB, the manufacturers, the airlines,
the airports, the associations, including A4A; AAAE; ACI-North
America; Global Business Travel Association; Air Cargo, Rail
Passengers, and Railway Industry Associations; Pipeline
Association; and then the international partners such as IATA.
Those are all critical to the success of TSA.
As we saw with the underwear bomber Christmas Day 2009, and
his nonmetallic and composite explosive device, and the toner
cartridge plot that I mentioned, terrorists are innovative and
determined, so must we be. Spiral development is one thing, but
breakthrough technology is even better.
I had the opportunity to testify 3 times before the 9/11
Commission and, of course, one of the findings from that was
that one of shortcomings of the U.S. Government writ large
counterterrorism efforts prior to 9/11 was a ``failure of
imagination''. It is incumbent, I believe, on all of us to
ensure that doesn't happen again.
Then my last point, 3.5, is on cybersecurity, which has
been mentioned; same points as on innovation through
investment, partnership, maximize the partnerships, evaluate
and repeat. So thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to take
questions from you and the committee at this time.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Pistole follows:]
Prepared Statement of John S. Pistole
September 29, 2021
Chairman Thompson, Ranking Member Katko, Members of the committee,
thank you for the opportunity to testify before you today. I must
admit, it's a freeing feeling testifying as a former TSA administrator.
I would just like to highlight a few key points as I assess the
landscape of transportation security in the United States 20 years
after 9/11.
First, as you know Chairman Thompson, when I was confirmed by the
Senate in June, 2010 and began my tenure as TSA administrator, I was
pleasantly surprised at the broad, almost sweeping authorities Congress
had given the position when the Bush administration proposed it after
the 9/11 attacks. I'll be glad to cite 1 or 2 examples during my oral
testimony. My strong recommendation to you and all of Congress is to
maintain these broad authorities which allow TSA, through its
administrator and the Secretary of DHS, to act quickly and decisively
in time of imminent threat, such as was experienced on Christmas Day
2009 with the ``Underwear'' bomber, or with the October, 2010, AQAP
toner cartridge bombing plot. Under these broad authorities, my
leadership team and I were able to effectively address those threats
through domestic and global mitigation measures through my issuance of
Emergency Amendments and Security Directives. Additionally, under these
broad authorities, we were able to envision and implement the popular
trusted traveler program TSA PreCheck, now with nearly 11 million
members.
Second, I would encourage you and the administration to ensure the
administrator has maximum flexibility and authorities for internal
personnel matters, such as pay, promotion, and representation. When I
issued my Determination to allow TSA employees the right to pursue
collective bargaining, it was important in my mind to recognize and
support the front-line workforce, especially the Transportation
Security Officers (TSOs), while ensuring that security considerations
remained outside the purview of the CBA. I could not imagine a
situation where TSOs would be allowed to go on strike in a time of
crisis, thereby possibly impacting National security.
Third, I believe both of my successors, Adm Peter Neffinger and Adm
David Pekoske, have done an outstanding job of encouraging innovation
in and among the TSA workforce and with key stakeholders, including
providers of security equipment and processes. This type of innovation,
such as done through the Innovation Task Force, is critical for
ensuring that TSA stays at least one step ahead of the terrorists. And
the best innovation I've seen is usually done in partnership with
industry. The best way to facilitate meaningful partnerships is through
shared investments. So my strong recommendation in this respect is that
your committee, working with the Appropriators and OMB, help fund this
innovation work to incentivize the private sector, which obviously has
to have a positive return on investment. And this security investment
needs to be made not only in the screening equipment at airport
checkpoints and checked baggage locations, but in the processes and
connectivity which enables TSA to seamlessly ``deploy next generation
technology today'' across the 440+ airports with TSA personnel.
Finally, each day we hear about new cyber attacks, especially
ransomware, impacting private businesses and governmental agencies
globally. This spring's Colonial Pipeline attack caused panic buying
across the southeast United States and, frankly, I think most Americans
were surprised to learn that TSA has regulatory authority over that
critical infrastructure. Congress and the administration must continue
investing money, resources, and personnel, to ensure that key
transportation systems, whether pipelines or much better known critical
systems such as Secure Flight and FAA's Air Traffic Control systems,
are secure 24/7.
The women and men of TSA are dedicated to keeping travelers safe.
Thanks for doing your part to ensure they have the tools, resources,
and support to do this critical job properly. I'll be glad to take any
questions you may have.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you very much. I now ask Admiral
Loy to summarize his statement for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF JAMES M. LOY, PRIVATE CITIZEN, FORMER
ADMINISTRATOR, TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION
Mr. Loy. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Katko, and Members of
the committee. I appreciate being included in your committee's
look-back and on-going oversight of TSA. As the commandant of
the Coast Guard on 9/11/01, I joined millions of my fellow
citizens as we watched the events of that day unfold. The Coast
Guard organized and led the maritime boat lift in the New York
Harbor that evacuated over half a million people from Manhattan
over the water to Staten Island and New Jersey, and that day
remains for me and for all Americans sort-of our generation's
Pearl Harbor.
I remember well the countless meetings that followed as we
came to terms with the reality that the two great oceans no
longer were going to provide any guarantee that America cannot
be reached by those intent on doing us harm. The resulting
legislation created first the TSA and then the Department of
Homeland Security. Those pieces of legislation were
announcements to the world that we had awakened to this new
terrorism threat. The days that followed included the most
significant in Executive branch reorganization since 1947.
Coordination with the Congress produced the TSA Act
outlining the establishment and shape of this new Executive
agency. Where the FAA had heretofore been responsible for both
safety and security of commercial aviation, the new law called
for the security elements to be responsibility of the new TSA.
Although centered on aviation, for obvious reasons the law
mandated that the new agency focus on all modes of
transportation.
The legislation provided the road map and we then set about
to establish the agency. It was probably the most--it was the
most gratifying yet challenging years of my 42 years of public
service as we took that on. We recruited applicants for 60,000
positions at airports across the country. Those applicants were
vetted, hired, trained, and distributed to over 400 airports in
9 weeks.
We allowed the reality of the stand-up process to shape and
evolve the agency, which has continued to-date. We will work
with all the major airlines, the trade associations, the
appropriate Government agencies, foreign advisors, commercial
vendors to design and outfit with thousands of checkpoints that
would provide that physical security required by the law.
I will never forget the night of 12/31, December 31, 2003,
when I was able to report to then Secretary Norm Mineta that
the airport on Guam had ``gone green,'' which was our
vernacular for gaining operational compliance with the law. As
in any endeavor of this magnitude, it required contributions
from many to be accomplished well and on time. As is also the
case with any such endeavor, changes were made in policy and
practice as I and my successors in the administrator's chair
led and managed the agency over the years, which you have
already heard.
Mr. Chairman, several things stand out to me as being
deserving of the committee's on-going attention. First, and it
has been mentioned already, the adequacy of TSA's link to the
intelligence community for threat analysis and for the
evolution of what that threat means to the operating days and
weeks of the agency itself.
Second, adequate attention to all modes of transportation,
not just aviation. It is clearly reasonable that we have
focused on aviation over the years, but terrorist incidents,
for example in London in subway systems and Spain on rail
systems, make those serious issues as well, and I appreciate
the committee's on-going attention to all modes of
transportation, not just aviation.
Then a constancy of focus on response and recovery as well
as preparedness and prevention planning for dealing with any
scenario that would interrupt the transportation system.
Mr. Chairman, we plank-owners at TSA are enormously proud
of our time in standing up and leading the agency. We coined
the motto, ``Never forget,'' and just met together for the 20th
annual ceremony remembering the events of 9/11/2001. The staff
and employees all renewed their oath of commitment to remain
vigilant in their quest to keep America secure.
I take no comfort in the fact that 20 years have gone by
without another 9/11. We have to remain vigilant and diligent
and focus on today and tomorrow, and this hearing is to me a
formal statement about how important that relentless diligence
is to keeping us safe going into the future.
Thanks very much, Mr. Chairman, and I look forward to your
questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Loy follows:]
Prepared Statement of James M. Loy
September 29, 2021
Mr. Chairman/Ranking Member, thank you for including me in your
committee's look-back and on-going oversight of the Transportation
Security Administration (TSA).
As the Commandant of the U.S. Coast Guard on 9/11/2001, I joined
the millions of my fellow citizens as we watched the events of that day
unfold. The Coast Guard organized and led the maritime boatlift in New
York Harbor that evacuated over 500,000 souls from Manhattan over the
water to Staten Island and New Jersey. That day remains for me and for
all Americans our generation's Pearl Harbor. I remember well the
countless meetings that followed as we came to terms with the reality
that the two great Oceans no longer provided any guarantee that America
could not be reached by those intent on doing us harm. The resultant
legislation creating first the TSA and then the Department of Homeland
Security were announcements to the world that we had awakened to the
new terrorism threats. The days that followed included the most
significant Executive branch reorganization since 1947.
Coordination with the Congress produced the Transportation Security
Act outlining the establishment and shape of the new TSA. Where the FAA
had heretofore been responsible for both the safety and security of
commercial aviation, the new law called for the security elements to be
the responsibility of the new TSA. Although centered on aviation for
obvious reasons, the law mandated that the new agency focus on all
modes of transportation. I was scheduled to retire from the Coast Guard
in May, 2002, but was asked by Transportation Secretary Norm Mineta and
President Bush to lead the stand-up of TSA. The following years at TSA
and then DHS became the most challenging and gratifying years of my 42
years of public service. The legislation provided the road map and we
set about to establish the agency. We solicited applicants for 60,000
positions at airports across the country. Those applicants were vetted,
hired, trained, and distributed to those airports in 9 weeks. We
allowed the reality of the stand-up process to shape and evolve the
agency. We worked with all the major airlines, the trade organizations,
the appropriate Government agencies, foreign advisors, and commercial
vendors to design and outfit the thousands of checkpoints that would
provide the physical security required by the law. I'll never forget
the night of 12/31/2003 when I was able to report to Secretary Mineta
that the airport on Guam had ``gone green'' which was our vernacular
for gaining operational compliance with the law.
As in any endeavor of this magnitude, it required contributions
from many to be accomplished well and on time. As is also the case in
any endeavor, changes were made in policy and practice as I and my
successors in the administrator's chair led and managed the agency over
the years.
Mr. Chairman, several things stand out to me as being deserving of
the committee's on-going attention:
Adequacy of the TSA's link to the intelligence community for
threat analysis and evolution
Adequate attention to ALL modes of transportation, not just
aviation
Constancy of focus on Response and Recovery as well as
Preparedness and Prevention planning for dealing with any
scenario that would interrupt transportation service.
Mr. Chairman, we plank-owners at TSA are enormously proud of our
time standing up and leading the agency. We coined the motto NEVER
FORGET and just met together for the twentieth annual ceremony
remembering the events of 9/11/2001. The staff and employees all
renewed their oath of commitment to remain vigilant in their quest to
keep America secure. I take no comfort in the fact that 20 years have
gone by without another 9/11. We have to remain diligent and focus on
today and tomorrow. This hearing is to me, a formal statement about how
important that relentless diligence is and must remain. NEVER FORGET!
Chairman Thompson. I thank the witnesses for their
testimony. Obviously, your unique role within TSA speaks for
itself.
So, I remind each Member that he or she will have 5 minutes
to question the witnesses. I will now recognize myself for
questions.
TSA is a unique agency within Government. No other agency
interacts so intermittently with such a broad swath of the
public on a daily basis. All of us can remember Admiral Loy
when we first started. You know, we were basically trying to
put it together because we needed to do it, so the men and
women did a wonderful job. We have come a long way as an
agency. We have done the threat analysis and the threats have
changed from time to time.
But what I would like to do is go from our current
administrator back to Admiral Loy to talk about what did you
find most challenging during your tenure of leading TSA? If you
could point to that issue that you felt that you just had to
somehow address, and with our current administrator, I am sure
you could start us off with that.
Mr. Pekoske. Yes, Mr. Chairman, thank you. I would say, you
know, the thing that I found most challenging is something we
have already talked about this morning, and that is to ensure
that we adequately compensate our work force. I have found no
one disagrees with that at all. Everyone agrees. It is just
finding the funding to be able to execute on that very
important priority for all of us, and that is one of my very
top priorities as the administrator.
The other thing that I would mention from my 4 years-plus
now in this chair, one of the things that is very exciting
about being the administrator of TSA, what really requires an
awful lot of focus is there are a lot of things that come up
every single day, and there are a lot of priorities that any
one of us would look at and say we got to get that one done, we
got to get that one done. The challenge, really, and the
opportunity, is to establish those clear priorities so that we
get a concrete set of actions in place.
The key here, too, and my predecessors have already
commented on this, is it is not just TSA acting alone. We have
to act with our partners because our partners are part and
parcel of a successive security regime in this country. So it
is always providing that strategic direction to keep our focus
on true north and to get the most important priorities done.
But I would say, sir, you know, the most challenging, and I
hope to see some positive successes on this over the course of
the next several months, is on pay, particularly for our front-
line work force. Thank you.
Chairman Thompson. Admiral Neffenger.
Mr. Neffenger. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would certainly
echo everything that Administrator Pekoske just said, getting
adequate pay to the front line is critical and key. It is a
very challenging and demanding job out there, and one of the
things that really struck me when I came to TSA was how skilled
those front-line TSOs are in that job. You know, I think the
average American citizen and the average traveler has no real
appreciation for how much work it takes to be good at what they
do out there, so let me echo that.
Let me add, you know, a couple of challenges that I saw, as
you know I was--during my tenure was the time when we saw a
dramatic and significant increase in the number of people
traveling on a daily basis. We climbed over 2 million
passengers a day on average screening through the TSA
checkpoints, and that was in the face of--from staff shortages
and some other challenges that we had based upon DHS IG
findings that inadvertently were leaked, a Classified report
that was leaked to the public, and put TSA into a lot of crisis
situation and demoralized the front-line work force. So, I
would say one of the greatest challenges I faced was rebuilding
confidence in the agency and rebuilding a sense of purpose to
the front-line work force that was, unfortunately, the brunt of
most of the criticism that came out. As I said during that
time, if there is criticism to be had, it is not the front-line
work force that deserved it. It was the people who led the
agency that failed the front-line work force.
So, I think it was--in my mind, that was--one, it was one
of the more gratifying asterisks of my tenure as I watched that
front-line work force really regain its confidence and focus on
getting good at what they did again. But that was a
particularly challenging time I think for TSA and I have been
really proud of what they have accomplished since and have
continued to accomplish under the current administrator.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you. Mr. Pistole.
Mr. Pistole. Thank you, Chairman Thompson. I think when I
arrived as administrator in the summer of 2010 part of it was
to provide the opportunities to go from the one-size-fits-all
to a risk-based security using some common-sense things, and
then also helping professionalize the work force in a way that
they had not been afforded that opportunity previously by
creating the TSA Academy down at FLETC and then also creating--
expanding on the office work force engagement, and then did the
Office of Professional Responsibilities.
So, I had come from the FBI, you know, an agency that had
been around more than a hundred years, had time to really build
some of that infrastructure to say--systems and processes to
say here is how consistent, fair adjudication of misconduct and
other things should be. So, I was given that opportunity and
with a great support from the Department, from you and others
on the Hill, and obviously from the work force to say, yes,
let's take these steps to help professionalize and provide that
exceptional service that is expected for those 2 million-plus
passengers a day. So those were some of the challenges and
highlights.
Chairman Thompson. Admiral Loy.
Mr. Loy. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. I think my recollection, you
know, in the stand-up process was the very simple recognition
from those of us who were in the middle of the crucible, so to
speak, recognizing that we didn't have a corner on the market
of good ideas. We reached out as you have defined partnerships
to so many different players, trade associations of commercial
aviation, and the land transportation elements of our country.
I remember a personal association with Herb Kelleher, who
was then the president of Southwest Airlines, a remarkably
visionary kind of a guy, now passed unfortunately, but it was
his willingness as the CEO of a major airline to literally get
in the work trenches with us to figure out the best ways to do
what we needed to do next. So, I think that notion of American
citizens in lots of walks of life standing up and being willing
to be counted and being willing to participate in the design of
this new agency that was going to impact a large portion of
their lives, and that included even international reach.
I remember my colleagues at the Israeli Security Agency,
well-known for their already 40 years of focus on aviation
security around the globe, they could not have been more
deliberative. They allowed me to check very deeply into the way
they did business in Israel. Those ideas that we were able to
bring back and integrate into the design of the checkpoints, et
cetera, were critical to our early stand-up process, and I
think establishing standards lower than which we would never go
with regard to mandating superior performance out of our new
agency.
So, it is that partnership business and recognizing that we
needed to open our doors and windows to new ideas, and even
established existing ideas, that would help us establish this
agency as well as we could possibly do it.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you very much. Let me just say all
four of you have talked about the work force, how we need to
make sure that we pay them adequately for the job that they are
doing and give them the support as Government employees they
need. A lot of us have pursued that for quite a while, and I
look forward to working with the administrator currently to
make that a reality and treat our TSOs like all other
Government employees are, and if that is giving them Title 5
rights, we should do that.
The Chair recognizes the Ranking Member of the full
committee, the gentleman from New York, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Katko. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and it is good to see
all of the witnesses today. It has been a while since I have
seen you, Mr. Neffenger, and the others there, so I am happy to
have this moment to chat with you.
I don't have a question on the employee issue, but I do
want to make this statement and make it clear, which I think I
did at the last hearing. Since I have been in Congress, we have
been talking about getting better pay for the front-line
workers, and we have made minimal progress in that regard. That
is why I broke from my opposition to Title 5 funding and said I
was going to support it. So, let that be a warning that if we
don't get this issue fixed, I am going to support it going
forward.
The reason I was concerned about the funding last time is I
think people in the headquarters get paid quite a bit of money
and they are doing just fine. I am worried about the front-line
workers, and I am worried about their ability to have adequate
pay given the very serious job that they have, so let this be a
warning shot. I am not backing down from making sure they get
the support they need, and that is well past time for us to
institutionalize that salary for them.
Admiral Pekoske, I want to stick with you strictly because
you are in the job now. I agreed with what Mr. Pistole said
about the emerging technologies that the bad guys seem to be
quite adept at creating, and, obviously, we have something the
size of my cell phone that can take down a good-sized airplane.
So, I think computed tomography is one of the key things that
we need to have, and my concerns are that the computed
tomography is going to take so long to implement given the
budgetary constraints that we have right now that it is going
to be rendered obsolete by the time we get them all on-line in
10 years.
So, Admiral Pekoske, very briefly, do you have a number,
can you tell us what you need to get a hundred percent CT
technology at all the airport checkpoints Nation-wide and how
long it will take?
Mr. Pekoske. Yes, sir, thanks for your comments, and I
couldn't agree more. I mean, CT is one of the most important
technologies for us to advance in our checkpoint system. We
have done a really good job so far. We have got 300-plus units
already in place thanks to your support and the support of this
committee back in 2019. We also just awarded an option for 314
more of our brand-new midsized integrated systems. But when I
look at the length of time it is going to take us to get to all
2,400-plus X-ray systems currently in the country, that is a
very, very long time.
What I asked my team to look at is, hey, given the contract
vehicles that we are going to have in place or currently have
in place, how much could we spend every year reasonably to be
able to accelerate the implementation of this very important
technology? The answer is about 350 million a year just for CT.
But I say that----
Mr. Katko. For how many years? How many years, sir?
Mr. Pekoske. Probably about 5 years to get it all done.
But, you know, this is bounded a bit by practicality. I mean,
we just can't buy them all and replace them all at the same
time. That needs to be sequenced because there is a lot of
airport work that needs to be done, and there is also
manufacturing capability. But, you know, it is really critical
for us to get this technology in place as soon as we can. I
can't even describe, given this venue that we are in, the
difference in detectability that that CT technology provides.
It is really critical for our security.
Mr. Katko. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. I just think we
should really try and prioritize that with the other
committees. I think this is a message that is really important
for our Nation's security, the aviation security. Now, I want
to switch gears and talk about my One-Stop Security pilot
legislation, which looks to be voted on by the House this week
we hope. It is important bipartisan legislation, Mr. Pekoske,
which will raise a global baseline of aviation security and
will improve post-pandemic travel. So, Administrator Pekoske,
could you explain how One-Stop screening will streamline the
international travel while also enhancing global aviation
security standards?
Mr. Pekoske. Yes, sir, and I will start with how it will
enhance global aviation security and it will do that in a
number of ways. One, it will improve the technology baseline
globally with the airports that we have One-Stop agreements
with because we will specify what standards to screening that
we require and our partners are going to require for the other
direction coming to them.
We will also promote the establishment of common standards
for this technology around the globe, particularly in the
nations that have the most advanced aviation systems. We feel
that that will drive the technology industry to build to those
standards. So, in toto it brings the entire global aviation
system up to a much higher level.
Additionally, part of the One-Stop Security initiative is
to do covert testing that is integrated. Teams that are
integrated with that country's experts and our experts to do
covert testing to really assess the effectiveness of the
screening regimes that we put in place. So, in toto, it
increases the security of flights, you know, bound for the
United States. That is a very good thing.
Then from a passenger perspective, what that means for a
passenger, and I use a hypothetical, let's say for argument's
sake we have a One-Stop agreement with London Heathrow Airport
in the United Kingdom. What that will mean is a passenger
flying from London Heathrow through JFK and a follow-on flight,
let's say to Charlotte, North Carolina, does not need to be
rescreened in JFK because that screening will be satisfactorily
accomplished to our desires at London Heathrow. So, it greatly
facilitates travel and also improves security. Whenever I look
at technology investments or policy adjustments, I am looking
for that two-type benefit. One, first and foremost, to improve
security, and then second, improve the passenger experience and
facilitate travel.
Mr. Katko. Well, thank you very much. Mr. Chairman, before
I yield back, I just want to say to Mr. Neffenger and Mr.
Pistole, Mr. Pekoske and Mr. Loy, that I think history is going
to smile kindly upon all of you because you have taken an
impossible situation and you made it very good. So, I am proud
of all of you for the work that you have done to keep our
airlines safe, and I am very proud of the culture you have
created whereby you listen to oversight, you welcome oversight,
and you act upon it, and you have made TSA a much better agency
because of it. So, please don't stop taking the input from us
because we are trying to--we are on the same team here. I
appreciate all the front-line workers have done and we got to
do more to help them. With that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you very much. The Chair will now
recognize other Members for questions they may wish to ask the
witnesses. I will recognize Members in order of seniority
alternating between Majority and Minority. Members are reminded
to unmute themselves when recognized for questioning and to
then mute themselves once they have finished speaking and to
leave their cameras on so they are visible to the Chair. The
Chair recognizes for 5 minutes the gentlewoman from Texas, Ms.
Jackson Lee.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Mr. Chairman, thank you so very much for
yielding. Thank you for your leadership. Thank you to the
Ranking Member for us having a common viewpoint of National
security.
Let me take a moment to salute the Transportation Security
Administration and the TSOs of which every moment I have an
opportunity to fly into different airports, small, medium, and
large, I take a moment to talk to TSOs, supervisors, managers,
and others about both their needs and as well our commitment to
their service.
Let me thank you, too, Administrator Pekoske, for
committing to collective bargaining. Of course, we all support
the Chairman's legislation on that very important issue of
dignity, professionalism, and, of course, service.
Administrator Pekoske, let me go to you immediately and as
my time wanes I will be quickly trying to go to others. Tell us
in a pictorial oration of the daily protection in stopping
various incidences that might--or individuals that might get on
planes, knives, guns, and otherwise, that you can see over the
landscape that your agency and TSOs are stopping.
Mr. Pekoske. Yes, thank you, Congresswoman. I really
appreciate that question. I will just give you a sense for what
we have detected this calendar year to-date in our checkpoints.
If we start with live weapons, these are weapons that either
have a round chambered or a magazine inserted into the weapon,
we have detected 4,300-plus live weapons in our screening
checkpoints. The rate of weapons carriage in our checkpoints
now is about 2 times per million passengers what it was in
2019. Generally, when I reference prior activity I go back to
2019 because that was the pre-COVID year.
Other weapons which would be anything from stun guns to
replica weapons, almost 3,400 other weapons. Then go on to
prohibited items which are things like knives and throwing
stars, things of that nature, about 3,250 prohibited items.
Then one of the things that is really important about our
system is that we validate the identity of every single
passenger as they approach the screening checkpoint. This is
designed to ensure that we do provide the right level of
screening based on the risk that the passenger may represent.
So, having the right ID is critically important and we have
detected over 300 fraudulent IDs already. With the advent of
the credential authentication technology, those numbers will
continue to go up. I should also mention and I really
appreciate your support for our officers and for our Federal
air marshals, Federal air marshals perform a really critical
function of in-flight security and security in and around the
airport. We place our Federal air marshals on flights where we
deem there is more risk than others. This is also a job that is
not easy to perform. They have to be alert 100 percent of the
time and ready to quickly jump into action should the need be.
So I join you in recognizing the terrific work of our front-
line work force and really all those that support them, that
enable them to do the great work that they do. Thank you.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you so very much. Admiral Neffenger,
Pistole, and Loy, please try to get my question in for all of
you to get a few seconds in because I value and appreciate your
leadership. The Taliban now is in control of Afghanistan. We
know what happened 21 years ago or 20 years ago. Just an
assessment of how difficult or how important TSOs are, although
domestically based, even though we have an infrastructure
overseas, in what may be proposed or a new volatility. Admiral,
can you do that real quickly? I have seconds, please. Admiral
Neffenger.
Mr. Neffenger. Yes, Congresswoman Jackson Lee, thank you
very much for the question. That is an important question. I
think I go back to my opening comments and this is where it
takes great imagination to think about what the next level of
threats and the next array of threats may be, and in doing so,
recognizing that, you know, one, we hope we never catch a
terrorist at the checkpoint. There are a lot of failures that
would lead to that event happening, but I will tell you the
last line of defense, you know, in the airport is clearly the
TSO on the front line.
So for my----
Ms. Jackson Lee. Can I jump to Pistole? I am so sorry,
Admiral.
Mr. Neffenger. Yes, that is fine. Thank you.
Mr. Pistole. Yes, thank you, Congresswoman. Good to see
you, ma'am. I think there is still a number of gaps in the
intelligence collection opportunities as it relates to the
direct threat posed by the Taliban at this point. So the TSOs
and TSA really have been the last line of defense, it is even
more incumbent and crucial that they are doing their job in the
best professional way they can to make sure that nobody slips
through the cracks.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Mr. Loy.
Mr. Loy. Yes, I would just, you know, endorse exactly what
has already been said. The criticality of the link between the
intelligence world of TSA and the rest of the intelligence
community is absolutely crucial to being able to imagine in
advance what the scenario could be that we can then plan to
deal with if, in fact, it actually happened. So, I would just
highlight the criticality of the positive linkage between TSA's
intelligence wing and the rest of the intelligence community.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Very important. Thank you so very much. I
am sorry for the cutting off of the question. Thank you, Mr.
Chairman. I appreciate all of these gentlemen and TSA, salute
them as I said before. Thank you again.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you. The Chair recognizes the
gentleman from Louisiana, Mr. Higgins, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Higgins. I thank the Chairman and I would like to
commend the Chairman and the Ranking Member for holding this
hearing today on the state of TSA 20 years after 9/11. We
certainly as a body salute our front-line agents there that
struggle every day with millions of passengers, very
professional and keep America safe.
On 9/11, 9 of the 19 hijackers had been flagged in some
manner by Federal aviation as potential terror threats, and yet
they were still allowed to get on a plane due to the security
protocols at the time. Since then, of course, the Nation has
responded with the creation of the Department of Homeland
Security and TSA, and over the last 20 years, we have adjusted
as American citizens to this new enhanced level of screening
and safety and we appreciate the professionalism that we
witness every day.
We have evolved, TSA has changed, and American citizens
have adapted to those changes. We expect that the intelligence
failures prior to 9/11 will not be repeated. The Pentagon is
actively warning Congress of the increased likelihood of
terrorist attacks on U.S. soil. It is critical that in this
time of heightened threat levels that all gaps in our National
security are reviewed and sufficiently addressed.
It is with that spirit that I point out the TSA website
currently has 16 forms of identification that are accepted to
get on an airplane. These documents are not codified in law and
is subject to change based on bureaucratic orders and rules.
The TSA website states that in coordination with DHS
counterparts, TSA has identified acceptable alternative
identification for use in special circumstances at the
checkpoint. Now, many would consider this a loophole that has
allowed undocumented human beings to access our airplanes
across the country through TSA.
So Administrator Pekoske, would you address that, sir, in a
brief response? Has Secretary Mayorkas instructed TSA to allow
undocumented migrants on a plane without one of the 16
acceptable identification documents?
Mr. Pekoske. No, sir. We have worked very hard with
undocumented new arrivals into the country that need follow-on
air travel to ensure that we are sure who they are, and we work
very closely----
Mr. Higgins. Excuse me, good sir. You are saying that you
are sure who an undocumented immigrant is that is getting on an
airplane although the Department of Homeland Security itself
and Customs and Border Patrol will readily admit we are not
positive who they are. In most cases, we are accepting who they
tell us they are, but you are telling me you know who they are.
That is what you are saying right now.
Mr. Pekoske. What I am saying is we use the very same data
that Customs and Border Protection obtains----
Mr. Higgins. Exactly, good sir. So. I am just asking,
America needs to know. America needs to know. I get it. You are
accepting what Customs and Border Protection is sending you,
but America needs to know are undocumented illegal immigrants
that are being transported to another part of our country, are
they getting on airplanes without a picture ID and without the
American Government, Customs and Border Protection, TSA,
Department of Homeland Security, are they getting on airplanes
to travel when we readily admit that we are not sure who they
are and they do not have photo ID, that they do not have one of
the TSA's own 16 forms of acceptable identification that
Americans themselves are subject to? I mean, yes or no, are
these people getting on a plane with us?
Mr. Pekoske. People are getting on the planes after they
are thoroughly screened before they even----
Mr. Higgins. Thoroughly screened by who?
Mr. Pekoske. By the TSA, sir.
Mr. Higgins. It is screened by TSA. You mean going through
the checkpoints like we all do?
Mr. Pekoske. Yes, sir. So----
Mr. Higgins. But they are going----
Mr. Pekoske [continuing]. We are sure when they enter the--
--
Mr. Higgins. But just clarify, please, good sir, in the
interest of time, are they going through--like I have to have
my photo ID to go through TSA checkpoints, but does an illegal
immigrant that is being transported somewhere else in the
country on an airplane, are they required to have a photo ID,
yes or no?
Mr. Pekoske. We have processes for people that do not have
photo ID.
Mr. Higgins. Are they required to have a photo ID? My God,
it is hard to get a straight answer out of this administration.
Chairman Thompson. The gentleman's time has expired.
Mr. Higgins. Well, can the gentleman answer my question,
good sir? You have extended that courtesy, Mr. Chairman. Can
the gentleman answer my question?
Chairman Thompson. The gentleman's time has expired. The
Chair recognizes----
Mr. Higgins. Can the gentleman answer my question?
Chairman Thompson. The gentleman----
Mr. Higgins. Mr. Chairman, I object to my colleagues across
the aisle----
Chairman Thompson. Well, I am going to tell you----
Mr. Higgins. [continuing]. Being granted additional time--
--
Chairman Thompson [continuing]. Your time----
Mr. Higgins. [continuing]. And yet Republicans are not. Can
the----
Chairman Thompson. No. No.
Mr. Higgins. Can Mr. Pekoske answer my question?
Chairman Thompson. No. No. The gentleman's time----
Mr. Higgins. It is a yes or no answer.
Chairman Thompson [continuing]. Has expired. Now, either
you recognize it or I am going to cut your mic off.
Mr. Higgins. Well, please do. But the man should answer the
question, yes or no. You have allowed my colleagues to answer
the question.
Chairman Thompson. Look, you can be civil, Mr. Higgins, or
you can just----
Mr. Higgins. I am trying to be civil, Mr. Chairman. You are
stopping----
Chairman Thompson. No. No. I am ruling----
Mr. Higgins. The man runs the TSA. It is a yes or no
question.
Chairman Thompson. But look----
Mr. Higgins. Will he answer it or not?
Chairman Thompson. I am not going put the administrator in
this position. Your time has expired.
Mr. Higgins. Wow.
Chairman Thompson. The Chair recognizes the gentleman----
Mr. Higgins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Thompson [continuing]. From New Jersey, Mr. Payne.
Mr. Payne. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Can you hear me, sir?
Chairman Thompson. Yes, we hear you. Go ahead.
Mr. Payne. Thank you. Let's see. This is for Mr. Pekoske
and Neffenger and Pistole. You know, over the years, TSA has
rolled out very sophisticated technologies and polices to
provide formidable defense against potential terrorist attacks.
Unfortunately, TSO pay and benefits have not evolved with the
rest of the agency as many long-time employees remain near the
bottom of the pay band. Unlike the General Schedule, or the GS,
pay system used by most Federal agencies, the TSA pay system
has not historically provided for regular salary increases.
Salary increases are not built into TSA's baseline budget and
identifying funding for fixing the problem of low pay has
proven to be difficult for Congress and multiple
administrations across party lines.
Do you believe TSA employees should receive regular salary
increases at the same level as most other Federal employees?
That is a yes and no.
Mr. Pekoske. Yes, sir.
Mr. Neffenger. Yes, I do.
Mr. Pistole. Yes, I do.
Mr. Loy. Absolutely.
Mr. Payne. Great. We are all on the same page. But it seems
like it has been a 20-year effort to get this enacted. Would
having such salary increases required under law make funding
increases through the annual budget and appropriations process
easier?
Mr. Pekoske. Yes. Yes, sir, it would.
Mr. Payne. OK, well, I thank you all for the concise
answers and I just don't understand why with the legislation
that the Chairman has put forth, we cannot get to the end goal
of making our TSOs the front line, to the men and women in the
field that have kept us safe for 20 years, cannot be
compensated in the manner in which they should be. It is just a
failure on our part--all of us here in these positions that
that has not happened. You know, it really pains me to see this
constant situation where the people working the hardest, the
people on the front lines, the people that are doing the grunt
work at times are never compensated as well as the people
sitting in the lofty offices. Just--it is just not right. It
harkens back, you know, to history in this country where the
people working the hardest are treated the worst. We just have
to stop it.
With that, Mr. Chairman, I will yield back.
Chairman Thompson. The gentleman yields back.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Mississippi for 5
minutes, Mr. Guest.
Mr. Guest. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Pekoske, I want to thank you for being here. I want to
thank you for the hard work that your men and women do every
day in keeping the traveling public safe. We know that TSA
officers are dedicated and they are hard-working public
servants that do a difficult job and we know the importance of
that job in protecting our homeland.
I want to follow up very briefly on Congressman Higgins'
questioning as it relates to the importance of photo ID in the
screening process. We know that that is something that has been
required now since 9/11 for members of the traveling public to
show some sort of photo ID. We know that that is something that
your men and women use during that screening process. I know
first-hand from when I was down on the border at McAllen seeing
immigrants who were in the airport waiting to board flights but
did not have that photo ID.
So my question to you is how can we adequately screen
migrants without a photo identification? If we are going to
require that of every American who is getting on a plane, how
can we adequately screen those who do not have that photo ID
available to them?
Mr. Pekoske. Yes, sir.
With migrants that may not have a photo ID in their
possession, we rely on the biographic and the biometric
information the CBP has collected when they cross the border.
We have the technology to have that information right in front
of us as the person is presenting themselves for screening.
Additionally, our protocols always require different levels
of screening based on the level of identity verification that
we have. So if you show up to a security checkpoint and you do
not have a photo ID we have processes in place where we do
whatever we can to see if we can establish your identity. In
this case, the same process happens with migrants with our CBP
colleagues. Then we provide enhanced screening to make sure
that a person doesn't have anything that would concern us in
their carry-on bags, on their person, and in any checked
baggage. Migrants typically do not have any checked baggage,
though.
Mr. Guest. Let me ask you, has TSA ever prohibited any
migrant from boarding flights and flying to the interior? Has
there been instances where TSA has told Customs and Border
Patrol that they--you will not allow those migrants to travel?
Mr. Pekoske. I am sure there have--I don't have the exact
number, sir, but I am sure there have been instances where we
have not been satisfied within the Department and we have gone
back and done some additional work. So the person didn't travel
at the time they wanted to or they might not have traveled at
all. But I don't have the specific numbers in front of me.
Mr. Guest. Well, and let me ask you about a particular
program, the CBP One, an app that is used. I know that it is
something that TSA is working with CBP on. At this time I would
ask the clerk if she would please put up a photo to accompany
my questions. Mr. Chairman, I would like this photograph to be
entered into the record as well.
As that is being put up, I will let you know that this was
a photograph----
Chairman Thompson. Without objection, so ordered.
[The information follows:]
Mr. Guest. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
This is a photograph that was taken at DCA and it says
there that photo capture--the particular section of the
document that I want to question you to, that the photo capture
is optional. As it relates to migrants, that migrants may
decline to have their photograph taken as part of this
screening process.
So it would seem to me that we have a two-tiered system.
That we have a system for United States citizens where we are
required by law when TSA requires us to show photo ID before
traveling, and then we have a second system for non-citizens in
which not only are they not required to show a photo ID, but
they can even decline to have their photograph taken if they
decide to do so.
So I would ask, if you could, if at all possible, please
talk about the disparity in when U.S. citizens travel versus
when migrants travel and why migrants have the ability to
decline to have their photograph taken, but yet as a citizen I
don't have the ability to decline to present a photo ID.
Mr. Pekoske. Yes, sir.
I am unaware of any circumstance where an undocumented
individual has declined to have their photo taken.
Mr. Guest. But they do have that option, do they not? From
the document there, clearly the documents state not once but
twice that they have the option. Not trying to be argumentative
but you----
Mr. Pekoske. Right.
Mr. Guest [continuing]. Would agree with me that that
document says on two different occasions that they have the
option to decline to have their photograph taken?
Mr. Pekoske. Again, I am not aware of any circumstance
where that has occurred.
Chairman Thompson. The gentleman's time has expired.
The Chair the gentleman from California, Mr. Correa.
Mr. Correa. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Can you hear me OK?
Chairman Thompson. Yes, I can.
Mr. Correa. Just wanted to thank you, Mr. Chairman and the
Ranking Member, Mr. Katko, for holding this hearing.
I was also in New York to commemorate the solemn
remembrance of the 20th anniversary of 9/11.
Mr. Pekoske, you are absolutely right, united in memory,
together in mission. I remember 20 years ago watching civilians
run from those burning buildings while the first responders
were essentially running in, knowing that we are probably
facing certain death. That moment that united us in America.
But today the lessons are we also have to be ready. That is
what this hearing is all about. We talk today about our TSA
front-line workers. I also Chair the Subcommittee on
Transportation and Maritime, so this issue is very near and
dear to my heart.
But, you know, I look at the issue of equity in pay not as
an issue of pay but rather professionalism. Nobody would
question what we pay our police officers or FBI agents because
they do the job and they put their lives out there. One of you
witnesses mentioned that the last line of defense for airlines
is essentially those TSA officers. Those people who are looking
into the screens or looking at us or really being pains to the
passengers for making those passengers open their luggage, look
in their places to make sure there is nothing there that should
not be going into a plane. So we have to make sure they are
professionals. It is not only about pay, it is about to make
sure that these folks are there for 30 years. We need their
professional expertise to protect us in the air.
So, you know, Mr. Pekoske, I would ask you to continue to
think about it as professionalizing the work force and making
sure that Americans have the best line of defense, their last
line of defense is their best.
I have a question for you similar to Mr. Higgins when it
comes to IDs. Remembering 9/11, those folks that got on those
airlines had valid IDs. The problem we had was a break in our
intelligence system. We knew those folks maybe should have been
questioned twice before they got on a flight, but they weren't.
We were acting homeland security in silos. No. 2, the issue of
IDs I think is secondary to making sure that those people don't
have an explosive on them and making sure that they can
actually--should be boarding the plane.
We can have an ID, anyone in the world, valid visa, valid
passport, and get on a flight. We just have to make sure that
we coordinate intel with the rest of the world, with our
friends and frenemies so to speak, to make sure somebody
doesn't bring down a flight.
So my question in the last few moments that I have, sir, is
how are we working to make sure, No. 1, TSA is no longer in
silos but sharing that information? No. 2, you are open to
folks across the pond, South America, to make sure we have the
best intel available.
Thank you.
Mr. Pekoske. Yes, sir. Congressman Correa, thank you very
much for your comments.
I couldn't agree more and what I would say is that in
addition to the comments you made, you know, TSO officers,
Transportation Security Officers, they are the last line of
defense. They have enormous responsibility on their shoulders.
It is our job to give them the discretion, the procedures, and
the technology so that they are successful in their very
important mission.
The other thing that I would emphasize is, you know, our
system is built on layers of security. We don't rely on any
single layer to ensure that somebody who gets on a plane
shouldn't be on a plane. We have multiple layers. As Mr.
Neffenger mentioned at the very beginning, in many ways if a
terrorist presents themselves for screening, we have already
had some issues in the other layers that should have picked
that up before that person even arrived.
Then going back to the migrants for a second, the non-
documented individuals with follow-on travel in this country,
we have captured their biometrics when they cross the border.
The One app does that. Those biometrics are compared to our
screening databases in our secure flight system. So there is--
given the biometric, there is some surety that that person is
not listed on any of our watch lists and has traveled.
Then, as you mentioned, we do do the right screening level
based on the information we have and the risks that the
individual presents.
The last thing I will mention, sir, very quickly, is one of
those layers--and you talk abut 9/11--one of those layers now
is a very robust Federal Air Marshal Service that are assigned
to flights based on the risk of the flight. They are an
incredibly professional group of individuals and their mission
is to prevent a terrorist attack in flight.
Mr. Correa. Thank you very much.
Mr. Chairman, how much time do I have? Or is my time out?
Chairman Thompson. The gentleman's time has expired.
Mr. Correa. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield.
Chairman Thompson. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from
North Carolina, Mr. Norman.
Mr. Norman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Administrator Pekoske, are you--did you say that the--when
Congressman Guest put up on the TSA website the photo capture
is voluntary, are you denying that? Are you saying that doesn't
exist?
Mr. Pekoske. No, sir, I am not denying it. I am saying I am
unaware of any situation where that has occurred. Additionally,
their biometric has already been checked with the checks that
we would make in our secure flight system as they cross the
border.
Mr. Norman. OK. Let me ask you this, how do you check
biometrics when they cross illegally? When they don't go
through the screening process. Walk me through how you get the
biometrics if they cross the border illegally.
Mr. Pekoske. Right. Well, so if we have somebody present at
the screening checkpoint that does not have----
Mr. Norman. No, no, no. I am saying if they cross illegally
where they don't go through the screening process, walk me
through what you do to get the biometrics when there is no
screening to them, they are illegal.
Mr. Pekoske. Correct. So those individuals would generally
not be allowed access to the screening checkpoint. these--the
folks that are undocumented----
Mr. Norman. No, no, no. But if you cross--you are missing--
you are not answering my question. It is a simple question. If
you come across, you don't have the biometrics, if they go to
the airport you have no documentation, what do you do? Do you
turn them away? Or if--they have got the right not to have
their picture. These are people who you have no information on.
How do you--walk me through the screening process. Americans
need to know this. And----
Mr. Pekoske. Yes, sir.
Mr. Norman. Just walk me through what you do.
Mr. Pekoske. I will walk you through quickly.
Whenever somebody presents themselves at a screening
checkpoint without identification we have a process we go
through to try to verify that identification. Depending on what
that process shows us depends on the level of screening we
provide that person. Or, if we are not satisfied that the
person should continue into the sterile area of an airport,
then they are not allowed into the sterile area.
Mr. Norman. OK. Let me ask you this, I was at McAllen,
Texas. I have been to the border.
Mr. Pekoske. Mm-hmm.
Mr. Norman. Several times. Out of 120 seats, 100 of them
were by those who had cardboard things across their necks
saying we don't speak English, show me which airport to get
on--which airplane to get on. They were allowed to get on. How
do you explain that?
Mr. Pekoske. We coordinate all of those very closely, sir,
with Customs and Border Protection. So my assumption, based on
the information you provided, is that all of those individuals
did cross the border, were registered, their biometrics
recorded by CBP.
Mr. Norman. Well, I don't know that. You assume that. But
this is----
Mr. Pekoske. Well, our procedures require that.
Mr. Norman. You know, you have to be right 100 percent of
the time. The terrorists that made 9/11 happen killed 3,000
people. They, as has been said, had identification. They were
just terrorists. We have got suicide bombers who have got
sophisticated things that can put in their bodies to blow the
whole airplane up, including themselves. How do you screen
against that?
Mr. Pekoske. We do a very thorough screening of anything an
individual is carrying and there on person, including a pat-
down. So we are sure that----
Mr. Norman. How about if they swallow----
Mr. Pekoske. Beg your pardon?
Mr. Norman. How about if they swallow it or put up one of
their cavities? How does that screen?
Mr. Pekoske. Our--we have a very thorough screening process
for both on-person detection and for carry-on bags that we are
very certain that an individual who comes into the sterile area
of an airport will not be carrying anything that could harm
anybody on a flight.
Mr. Norman. Not be carrying it, but they could put it in
one of their body cavities.
Mr. Pekoske. We have not seen that occur, sir.
Mr. Norman. OK. All right. So I guess what I am saying is
we have got an open border where known terrorists are getting
across, the ones we catch, but it is the ones we have not
caught. Here we are, I have not heard a peep out of TSA
objecting to this because we are going to have 1.5-2 million
illegals that are coming into the country. Some go through the
screening, those that get away, the terrorists, are smart
enough not to do it. You are saying you have got a 100 percent
proof that you will either deny them access on the airplane to
protect Americans and those who go through the process, as
Congressman Guest says, or you have got some magic way of
finding out who they are when you have no record, you have no
knowledge of--you don't have biometrics. But you are telling me
now that you have got a foolproof way to make sure that doesn't
happen. That they don't get on the airplane and that they--all
the sudden make--you are finding out a history that they have
not given before because they haven't come through the
screening process.
Mr. Pekoske. Yes, sir. What I am telling you is that people
that board aircraft anywhere in this country, including the
Southwest Border are thoroughly screened and we would not
permit them on aircraft if we had any concern that they might
present a threat to that aircraft or the passengers on board.
Mr. Norman. Well, if you don't have any information on
them, how does that not present a concern?
Mr. Pekoske. We have layers of security, sir, and identity
verification is one layer of security.
Chairman Thompson. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from
Rhode Island, Mr. Langevin, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank you
for convening this hearing.
Administrator Pekoske, I want to begin by thanking you for
your many years of service to our Nation. I want to begin also
by thanking you for your work on cybersecurity at TSA,
specifically for your release of two pipeline security
directives in the wake of the Colonial Pipeline incident.
I am, however, concerned that the second of these
directives was not made public. I understand of course the
reluctance to publish security directives may be rooted in
existing TSA practice, like aviation security. I know you and I
had that conversation on the phone yesterday and certainly I
understand that part of it. But knowing the specifics of
airport screening protocols would be highly useful, you know,
to terrorist groups who otherwise would need to physically
surveil airports to identify vulnerabilities that could enable
terrorist attacks. However, in the cyber realm bad actors don't
need physical access to conduct intelligence surveillance and
reconnaissance against our critical infrastructure. They can do
so from anywhere in the world.
So what is more, other agencies also publish security
directives, including CISA, which is specific vulnerabilities
and time lines called out in emergency directives TSA is
required to follow. So in my view all TSA is doing by shrouding
its cybersecurity directives in secrecy is denying itself the
benefit and the ability to improve these directives through the
feedback of the largest cybersecurity community.
So my question, Administrator Pekoske, would you consider
changing your policy and publishing the pipeline directives and
any future cybersecurity directives from TSA?
Mr. Pekoske. Yes, Congressman Langevin, thank you very
much. Thank you for your time yesterday. I enjoyed very much
and learned a great deal in talking with you, as always.
As I said yesterday, yes, we will. We will take that back
and look at that. You raised some very good points. I mean our
goal here is to provide as much information on what the right
cybersecurity preventive measures are and to get more and more
organizations in my position, owners and operators of
transportation systems, in the country to have stronger
cybersecurity measures in place. So I take your suggestion very
seriously, sir.
Thank you.
Mr. Langevin. Very good. Thank you.
Administrator Pekoske, I want to also ask you now about
ensuring compliance with TSA security directives. I understand
that pipeline owners and operators must maintain documentation
of their compliance with TSA regulations. I also understand
that TSA has the ability to verify self-reported security
controls through inspections.
During these inspections are TSA inspectors conducting on
network testing of systems?
Mr. Pekoske. Sir, right now they are not doing on-network
testing of systems, penetration testing. That is something that
CISA, Cybersecurity Infrastructure Security Agency, and TSA are
working on.
Mr. Langevin. OK.
Mr. Pekoske. We think that is important as well.
Mr. Langevin. So, you know, having inspectors and auditors
conducting on-network testing I believe is crucial for
evaluating a covered entity cybersecurity posture. Evaluating
the architecture of a network is not enough. Just because a
covered entity designs its human resources network, for
example, to be segmented from its operational technology
network does not automatically make that true. On-network
testing I believe is critical to verify those kinds of issues.
So in the absence of this testing TSA relies on self-
reporting, which I do not believe is sufficient. In my view,
the solution is for TSA to implement third-party auditing of
its covered entities and an impartial third-party auditor, such
as a critical--certified private sector company or CISA would
have both the impartiality and on network testing personnel
necessary to ensure covered entities actually adhere to TSA's
regulations.
So, Administrator Pekoske, TSA has the authority over
pipeline security for nearly 20 years, yet the first directive
was issued in May. I realize this is early days, but with that
in mind will you commit to working with me and the rest of this
committee on implementing third-party auditing to verify
compliance with TSA's security directives?
Mr. Pekoske. Yes, sir, I commit to working with you and I
appreciate your expertise.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Administrator.
You know, should you require additional statutory budget or
budgetary support to implement third-party auditing, will you
work with this committee to obtain that support?
Mr. Pekoske. Yes, sir.
Mr. Langevin. Very good. It is all I can ask.
Thank you very much.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you very much.
The Chair recognizes the gentlelady from Iowa, Ms. Miller-
Meeks.
Ms. Miller-Meeks. Thank you, Mr. Chair and Ranking Member
as well, and thank you to all of those providing testimony to
us today.
Since its inception in 2012, TSA PreCheck and expedited
screening has become very popular among members of the
traveling public, myself included. Administrator Pekoske, as
travel volume continues to recover, what more can TSA to do
significantly increase PreCheck enrollment moving forward?
Mr. Pekoske. Yes, ma'am, thank you for the question.
Actually, PreCheck enrollment now is almost 11 million
passengers. Our enrollment rates are now back at 2019 rates. So
there are now more people basically resuming the practice of
enrolling in PreCheck as pre-pandemic.
Additionally we are increasing our enrollment services
operation by adding two additional vendors to PreCheck
enrollment. So that should make PreCheck much more accessible
to people and much easier for them to register for that
important program. I appreciate your interest in it.
Ms. Miller-Meeks. Also one of the things I have noticed
when I am flying in and out of various airports, sometimes it
is smaller airports, but sometimes it is the very large ones
early in the morning or late in the evening that the PreCheck
lanes aren't operational. So what specifically is TSA doing
to--you know, you are promoting enrollment in PreCheck but you
also don't have the lanes open even though oftentimes there
seems like there is more than adequate to have the TSA PreCheck
lane open. So is there a number of passengers that have to go
through for the PreCheck to be open? How is that determined?
Why can't I always count on a PreCheck lane being open?
Mr. Pekoske. Ma'am, what we look at in terms of processing
is how long the wait is for passengers and we measure that at
every single lane in the country every hour. Our standard for
PreCheck processing is 5 minutes or less. So our protocol would
be to open additional lanes if we couldn't achieve that 5
minute wait time standard.
The other thing that we have instituted in the airports
that have a very small number of lanes and sometimes it is hard
to dedicate a single lane to PreCheck is a process called
blended screening, which means that the passenger in front of
you might be a non-PreCheck passenger, they will get the level
of screening that that requires, the next person, yourself, for
example, as a PreCheck passenger would then get PreCheck
screening.
So we are using that to provide passengers with the
convenience of PreCheck and the speed of PreCheck. But whenever
we see the wait time ticking out beyond 5 minutes overall then
that is the time to open up an additional lane.
Ms. Miller-Meeks. Yes, I think the challenge is that those
individuals who have PreCheck clearance or have CLEAR,
typically are very efficient in how they package their
materials. People that aren't, that blended, you know,
screening, takes a lot of time because the person in front of
you may not--they have to take their liquids out, they have to
take their laptop out, they have to take their belt, their
keys, their coins, et cetera. So you understand the dilemma it
poses.
But it is good to know that it is a 5-minute waiting
period, so I will keep track of that in the future and then let
you know.
Then, last, you know, Apple recently announced that it is
partnering with the TSA to have its customers use mobile
driver's licenses on their, you know, phones or watches as
proof of identification at certain airport checkpoints. Now, to
me this collaboration seems very exciting. I always worry about
losing my driver's license when I put it away to quickly go
through the screening process. So, you know, when should we
expect to see this technology at airport checkpoints and at
which States? Please explain the TSA's approach to
incorporating this security and efficiency benefits that
digital identity provides at the checkpoint.
Mr. Pekoske. Yes, ma'am. The digital identity, or the
mobile driver's license, is a very exciting initiative and we
have worked with a cooperative research and development
agreement with Apple. Had the same opportunity available to
non-Apple manufacturers as well. We expect to roll this out at
certain airports. Of course that requires the States to also
agree that their driver's license can be uploaded in a digital
format. There are several States that have already agreed to
that and we anticipate that we will roll out the mobile
driver's license capability in select airports beginning at the
very end of this calendar year or into early calendar year
2022.
So it is really--it is very--it is right around the corner.
Ms. Miller-Meeks. Well, thank you so much for that. As you
said, it is really exciting that it will be coming in the
forefront. So I hope it gets to my airports and I will check
with my State.
So thank you for that.
Thank you, Chair Thompson. I yield back my time.
Chairman Thompson. The gentlelady yields back.
The Chair recognizes the gentlelady from New York for 5
minutes, Ms. Clarke.
Ms. Clarke. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I thank our
Ranking Member. I thank our panelist for their expert witness
this morning.
My question--my first question is to the entire panel. In
the 20 years since TSA's formation the agency has confronted a
wide range of threats, which continue to evolve. In your view
what has emerged as the most prevalent challenges to TSA's
mission, to its work force, and to its resources?
Administrator Pekoske, why don't we just start with you?
Mr. Pekoske. OK. Thank you, ma'am. Appreciate that.
With respect to the threat picture, I mean the thing that
has emerged over the past several years is the prevalence of a
domestic terror threat, which is very different from a foreign-
based or foreign-inspired terrorist. It has required us to
refocus our effort. We have a very mature risk identification
and risk management process in TSA. It impacts both the
aviation sector and all the surface modes of transportation. So
there is a change in the threat.
Additionally, the threat is not just physical any longer.
There is a physical threat and a cyber threat that has
developed. We saw that with our directives to the pipeline
industry following the Colonial Pipeline ransomware attack.
So, you know, we have, just based on the changes to the
threat and the linkages that we have to the intelligence
community, to make sure that we are staying ahead of where the
threat is going. We change our procedures, we change our
technology in that regard.
I hope that is responsive to your question.
Ms. Clarke. What would you say that threat has presented to
the work force? Is there a need for additional training and
resources specific to that training?
Mr. Pekoske. Well, the threat has presented itself to the
work force in a number of ways. The key remedy we have for that
is to ensure that the work force has the right tools to do the
very, very important job that they have. So some of the
technologies that we have talked about this morning, the
credential technology, the new X-ray system, the on-person
detection systems, are very important to putting the right
tools in the hands of our work force.
Additionally, what is important as well is to have a
significant and visible presence to deter any potential threat
actor from acting out. This is particularly relevant in the
case of domestic terrorists.
Ms. Clarke. Would either of the other panelists care to
respond? Administrator Pistole.
Mr. Pistole. Yes. Yes, Congresswoman, this is John Pistole.
Unfortunately, in addition to the deaths of TSOs from
COVID, it was during my tenure that the murder--the execution
of TSO Gerardo Hernadez at LAX occurred by however this--you
know, disgruntled, mental health-challenged individual who shot
him in the back and then shot 2 other TSOs. So that is always
an issue on the minds of TSOs and of concern that what happens
when somebody who with that mindset and with a weapon can
simply walk into an airport before going through any security
and open fire. So that is something that I think is--it is a
challenge because working closely with the airport police, the
sworn law enforcement, in addition to some other resources,
that is one of the things that continues to be an issue.
Mr. Neffenger. Congresswoman Clarke, let me just add to
what Mr. Pistole said.
You know, I was in Brussels airport on the morning of March
22, 2016 when the Brussels airport attacks--2 suicide bombers
detonated their large suitcase bombs in the public area. So I
think these--the public areas of the airport are far more
challenging now than they used to be and are clearly a
potential target area. So we have done a great job of keeping
people from getting into sterile areas at the airport, but
those public areas are a great concern. As people have--can
rapidly radicalize because of the ability to find like-minded
ideological individuals on the internet and through social
media, it becomes much more challenging to stay ahead of that.
Ms. Clarke. Then in keeping that, I guess, Administrator
Pekoske, TSA has had to work closely with other agencies across
Federal Government throughout the COVID-19 pandemic. Has TSA's
collaboration with other Federal agencies matured since its
founding? Are there areas in which TSA still needs to improve
its inter-agency coordination efforts?
Mr. Pekoske. Ma'am, I think our inter-agency coordination
efforts are quite outstanding. You know, we have very, very
strong relationships across the board with all of our inter-
agency partners.
I think the continued area of focus for us, and it is not
that the relationships need improvement, it is just that the
focus is going to be even more so on the surface transportation
systems and the modes of surface transportation safety that
exists in the Department of Transportation. But the
relationships I think are very, very strong and very important
to us.
Ms. Clarke. Thank you.
I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, gentlemen.
Chairman Thompson. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from
Michigan for 5 minutes, Mr. Meijer.
Mr. Meijer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to our
witnesses for joining us here today. I appreciate this timely
and important look back on the 20th anniversary, or
thereabouts, of the founding of the Transportation Security
Administration and of our differing approach to travel,
security, and airport security, but not limited to that. That
touches upon my first question for the administrator.
You know, while most of the TSA resources have been focused
on commercial aviation your agency also has responsibility for
the security of mass transit, for freight rail, elements of
highway infrastructure, and other critical transportation
sectors. The ransomware attack on the Colonial Pipeline earlier
this year was the first opportunity for many of us to learn
that TSA also had responsibility for pipeline security.
So I guess my question to you, Mr. Administrator, is how is
the TSA ensuring that these missions are receiving adequate
attention and resources? Are there any components of the broad
mission apart from airport security that have been historically
underfunded or neglected, either by Congress or DHS leadership?
Mr. Pekoske. Sir, the way we assess resource allocation
within the agency, and this affects our allocation within the
current budget year, then also our budget request for the
future years, is looking at the risks and how the risk is
changing. So this is informed by intelligence information, it
is informed by information we receive from our Government
partners and our private-sector partners across the board. We
assess risks. As the risk changes then we put in risk
mitigation measures that might require a redirection of funds.
We have also organizationally to make sure, to your point,
that surface transportation security is achieving the right
priority. Thanks the work of this committee in our 2018 re-
authorization we have established a separate assistant
administrator position and staff for surface transportation
security and have a similar staff in our policy operations. So
surface transportation policy has its own organization. Surface
transportation operations is also a clearly-identified
organization.
Finally, we have established regional networks where we
have a leader, a member of the Senior Executive Service in 5
regions around the country, all aligned with the FEMA regions,
that oversee surface transportation security in the interaction
with those owners and operators on a regional basis and has
available for them literally hundreds of inspectors to be able
to do the important work we do.
Mr. Meijer. I appreciate that answer, Mr. Administrator.
I just wanted to quickly follow up. You know, it has been 2
decades since these missions were put under TSA during that--or
close to 2 decades during that reorganization in the early
2000's. At this point, looking back on 15 to 20 years of
operations, do you think that any of these missions should be
reassigned to other components within DHS or within the broader
Executive branch?
Mr. Pekoske. No, sir, I do not. I think the missions that
are assigned to TSA are exactly the right missions and I think
we have demonstrated that over the course of 20 years. I would
just highlight with respect to the Colonial Pipeline, because
of the authorities Congress has provided us in law and
reinforced in our re-authorization, we were able to move very,
very quickly in putting measures in place to mitigate any
future attacks on critical pipeline systems.
So I think that the missions that we have is exactly right
for TSA. It is incumbent upon us, of course, to make sure that
we coordinate robustly, to the prior question, with our inter-
agency partners not just at the Federal level, but also
particularly in surface transportation items at the State and
local eminence below us.
Mr. Meijer. On that inter-agency partner point, can you
give a better--or a little bit additional description on TSA,
how would they collaborate with specifically the intelligence
community, but also with the private sector on security, you
know, vetting procedures, intelligence sharing? You know, what
type of coordination problems persist and what is TSA doing to
address those challenges?
Mr. Pekoske. Yes, sir. It is probably best that I just
briefly describe how we--when we see a threat stream
developing, how we change our procedures, how we might change
some of the requirements we place on private sector or other
public owners and operators of systems. Essentially the way we
do that is to bring the chief security officers of those
organizations in, provide them an intelligence brief, so that
they are looking at the intelligence that we see, and then
collaborate closely with them to achieve the security outcomes
that we know we have to achieve.
This can happen fast. We have been very successful with
doing this. It can happen fast and what it net results in is a
private sector or a local government partners who understand
the threat and understands the rationale for the measures we
put in place. Then for the private-sector operators, they can
also offer different ways of accomplishing the security outcome
we want to accomplish. Sometimes their measures are actually
more effective because they know their systems better than we
do at time. Oftentimes they require less cost. From my
perspective, as long as we can achieve the desired security
outcome, we will generally approve those, what we call
alternative measures.
Mr. Meijer. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
Chairman Thompson. The Chair recognizes the gentlelady from
Nevada, Ms. Titus, for 5 minutes.
Ms. Titus. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I would like to ask the administrator about the new opening
of the international travel markets. I represent Las Vegas,
McCarran Airport, and we welcome a lot of international
travelers and we expect that number to increase. It was
especially good to hear that the administration had lifted the
restrictions on a number of places around the world. As the
same time these new travelers are going to be coming American
travelers are going out again. They have this pent-up need to
go out and travel after a year-and-a-half of being locked down.
So we are going to see a lot more people in the air.
Now, we have seen that the aviation infrastructure really
wasn't prepared to deal with so many at one time. It was kind-
of like the problem after 9/11. I am wondering how TSA is
preparing to welcome all these new travelers, especially the
international ones, and what resources you might need or
something we might be able to do to help us accommodate them.
We know that travel begins the minute you leave the house. So
your airport experience is a part of how you remember the trip
of going and coming. So could you address that for us?
Mr. Pekoske. Yes, Congresswoman Titus, happy to address
that.
One of the things that is very important for us is that we
in working with the carriers project what we think air travel
will be for the coming year. I know that is hard to do
sometimes the further out you go, but we have been very
successful in identifying a window of, you know, the minimum
and the maximum number of passengers, except for the COVID
years. But certainly we were in fact very, very close to our
estimates for this past summer. So what that does is it drives
the requirement for the staffing levels at airports around the
country. What is important here is that because of the training
that is necessary to certify one of our officers in the
important jobs that they have at the checkpoints, we really
need to hire people a good 4 to 5 months ahead of when the
passenger need will be.
So we are in the process now really of looking at next
summer's travel projections, ensuring that we bring on an
adequate number of transportation security officers to handle
that demand.
Finally, we work very closely with the airports, like your
airport in Las Vegas, to do whatever we can to make sure that
we have the right number of lanes. Whenever an airport wants to
add an additional lane to their screen checkpoint, we welcome
that every single time and we will staff those lanes so that we
can manage the flows during the peak periods. Because, as you
know, there are certain times of the day when a lot of flights
depart and so those tend to be very challenging for everybody
to get through not just screening but to get through ticketing
and to get out to the gate.
Ms. Titus. Like a Monday morning after a Raiders' game, you
have got a lot of people going through that airport.
Well, thank you. I am glad to hear that.
Another question related to our international travelers is
their ability to read the signs. I know if I am in China in an
airport and I can't read the signs, I am going to be lost. So
we have a lot of those international travelers, as well as the
fact that Las Vegas is an international city in terms of its
residents.
Our committee--thank you, Mr. Chairman, for helping with
this--passed the Translate Act and it got out of the House, got
stuck in the Senate, but that was to be sure that all the
signage is in several different languages as well as accessible
for people who are visually or hearing impaired. Is TSA making
any progress along those lines even though the bill didn't
pass?
Mr. Pekoske. Yes, ma'am. In fact at Las Vegas Airport the
Las Vegas Airport Authority has been kind enough to provide an
entire checkpoint to TSA to test out our newest technologies.
The benefit of this arrangement at Las Vegas is that we can
actually divert passengers to this checkpoint and have actual
passengers go through some of our changed processes or new
technology so we can assess how it actually works in a real-
life situation.
One of the things we look at in terms of signage are what
are called totems that are electronic signs that can be changed
to provide information in different languages. You know, often
times we can make a pretty good guess at what languages would
need to be accommodated in a given airport given where the
flights are flying off to or coming from.
So a lot of work is being done on that and to provide as
much easy information as we possibly can to passengers.
Ms. Titus. Well, that is great.
I know that McCarran is an innovation checkpoint. You have
been using some UV screening as well to clean the luggage
places and--is that working out? Have you been able to
translate some of the things that you discovered there to other
airports?
Mr. Pekoske. Yes. We are still testing that UV technology
out, ma'am, but essentially when the bins get returned in what
are called automatic screening lanes, these are, you know, 70-
or 80-foot-long lanes that allow multiple people to divest, put
their stuff in a bin at the same time, so that improves flow.
It also makes sure that when we want to search a bag that it is
not accessible to that passenger. So a passenger can't reach
and pull a bag that we know we need to search. Then there is
plenty of room for a passenger to kind-of recompose after the
screening process is done. But the idea is that those bins
would--as they travel back to the front of the lane, would be
UV scanned and that would reduce the virus load in those bins.
So far our testing shows that works pretty well. We are just
testing different times to dwell and also the brightness of the
light.
But if this continues to proceed I would expect that we
would have that as an option in our systems across the Nation.
Ms. Titus. Great. I know you have got that CAT system----
Chairman Thompson. The gentlelady's time has----
Ms. Titus [continuing]. Too where you can scan your own ID.
So that is great.
Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is good news.
I yield back.
Chairman Thompson. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from
Georgia, Mr. Clyde, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Clyde. Well, thank you, Chairman Thompson. I appreciate
this opportunity and this hearing.
This question would be for Administrator Pekoske. Earlier
this year I joined some of my colleagues on a trip in April to
witness the crisis in the country that we are experiencing at
our Southern Border. On our way back there were multiple
illegal migrants who had been apprehended between 24 and 72
hours prior to our flight. We also know that--or we were told
that there were several individuals on the known terrorist
database that had been apprehended at the border.
Now, with such a quick turnaround time in processing
migrants who illegally cross, that is 24 to 72 hours, how is
TSA ensuring that the safety and security of domestic
transportation systems are not compromised? I mean these
illegal migrants, many have not received a thorough medical
assessment. What concerns me greatly is how do we know whether
these people have a criminal record in their home country?
So what information are you relying on to properly vet the
migrant passengers? I mean you are doing it within 24 to 72
hours. So how are you doing that?
Mr. Pekoske. Yes, sir. The vetting that we provide is done
electronically, so the time is not the critical factor here.
Essentially what we do is we take the biographic and biometric
information and compare that to watch lists that we hold in the
U.S. Government to ensure that nobody who is a known or
suspected terrorist is admitted into the airport without either
very thorough screening or they might be in a category where
they are just not permitted to fly. There are different levels
that we assess.
So it is based on biographic, biometric information. We may
not have information on their criminal history in their home
country, but, you know, we do have that good biometric
information to compare to our watch list.
Mr. Clyde. OK. So I heard you in previous testimony talk
about enhanced screening and multiple layers. I think you said
you do whatever we can. But if a person doesn't actually have
ID, all right, and their name is Joe and they tell you that
their name is Sam, all right, now am I correct in that prior to
getting on these flights that if they don't have ID you
actually create a Government ID for them? Is that right? Or is
that not right?
Mr. Pekoske. No, sir, that is not right. You know, we make
an assessment passenger to passenger as to whether we think a
passenger should be permitted into the sterile area of an
airport or onto an aircraft. So it is a very individualistic
look. I am very confident that we do that carefully and
successfully for every passenger that boards an aircraft.
Mr. Clyde. OK. So every American that flies has to have a
photo ID, all right, that actually verifies who they are. But
yet what you are telling me then is an illegal migrant doesn't
have to have a photo ID and we don't necessarily know who they
are. You might actually screen them to make sure they don't
have, you know, knives or whatever, something illegal on the
airplane, but we don't know if they are a criminal coming into
this country that has ill intent, something beyond the airport
itself or not. Isn't that what you are telling me? That you
don't know that.
Mr. Pekoske. Sir, this goes back to our multiple layers of
security. What I will tell you we do know is we do know that
any person who is permitted into the sterile area of an airport
or boards an aircraft has been properly screened so that the--
if they do not pose a risk to the aircraft or to other people
in the sterile area. I can guarantee you of that.
Mr. Clyde. OK. All right. So it is OK for TSA to allow
people on an aircraft without an actual Government-issued ID.
On what authority do you allow that? All of us, we have to have
one.
Mr. Pekoske. Yes, sir. I have the authority as the
administrator to allow that. There are passengers that are
American citizens that occasionally show up in screening
checkpoints that do not have their ID with them. Again, we have
a verification process that we use to see if we can verify the
identity. We make a judgment at the time based on criteria we
have in the agency and we ensure that all passengers are
thoroughly screened before they board an aircraft.
Mr. Clyde. OK. All right.
Let me follow up with you on this, TSA requires anyone
traveling from other countries to provide a confirmed negative
COVID-19 test within 72 hours prior to their entering the
United States. Is this same standard being applied to illegal
migrants as well?
Mr. Pekoske. To the best of my knowledge it is not being to
illegal migrants. That is the Centers for Disease Control
decision.
Mr. Clyde. OK. But yet you enforce it, right?
Mr. Pekoske. Customs and Border Protection and TSA enforce
it, yes, sir.
Mr. Clyde. OK. All right.
Chairman Thompson. The gentleman's time has expired.
Mr. Clyde. OK.
Chairman Thompson. The Chair recognizes the gentlelady
from----
Mr. Clyde. Thank you. I yield back.
Chairman Thompson [continuing]. New Jersey, Ms. Watson
Coleman.
Ms. Watson Coleman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you
to each of our witnesses for this very informative discussion
that we are having.
Let me associate myself with your comments and the Ranking
Member and every Member who has spoken out on behalf of the
compensation and the recognition of the significance of our
front-line workers here, our TSOs, and that they should have
predictability, a pathway for a career. This would help us with
the morale issues.
I have--I think about the unique question. In the 21st
Century you may not need a terrorist aboard a plane to hijack
it. As planes, trains, subways, and buses become increasingly
automated, we need to be prepared for when hijackers inevitably
put lives at risk by launching a cyber attack against the
operational or navigation systems of the transportation target.
As we have seen in recent ransomware attacks, our adversaries
consider no target off-limits.
So, Administrator Pekoske, I would like to speak to you
about this. How does TSA work with its inter-agency partners to
prevent malware from infecting the operational systems of its
planes, trains, subways, buses, et cetera? Are you in
conversations with CISA and DoT and the FAA and other
regulators to ensure this threat is addressed and that TSA
plays a significant role in mitigating it?
Mr. Pekoske, please.
Mr. Pekoske. Yes, ma'am. Thank you, Congresswoman Watson
Coleman, for your question.
Yes, we are in very close coordination with CISA for sure
and then with all of the modes in the Department of
Transportation, whether it is FAA, PHMSA, Federal Railroads, et
cetera. So that coordination is very good.
Additionally, it is important that we coordinate closely
with the owners and operators of those systems and also to
bring on cybersecurity expertise within TSA and to ensure we
have good strong connections with CISA to be able to benefit
from their expertise overall.
So I think we have made a lot of progress on cybersecurity
already, but I recognize, and I think you would agree, that a
lot more needs to be done.
Another key element, just to quickly mention, ma'am, is we
are offering very specific briefings to the CEOs and CSOs of
these organizations so that they understand the threat that we
see and the urgency of getting at it.
Ms. Watson Coleman. Thank you, Mr. Pekoske.
I also know that there were advisories issued by you all
after the malware attack on the Pipeline. I am wondering if you
are considering the same kinds of oversight and
accountabilities from these other transportation systems, the
airplanes, the buses, the subways, the trains. I think that
these are reasonable targets and I don't know if you are
engaged in those discussions, I don't know if you have enough
resources to be able to address this area.
I would like to have your response to that so that we could
be as helpful as possible.
Mr. Pekoske. Yes, ma'am, we are engaged with those owners
and operators and private-sector companies. There has been a
very good dialog to date. We will of course base our actions
based on the risk that we see. So the risk to one element of
surface might not be the same as the risk to another. Or even
within the pipeline sector there were certain pipeline owners
and operators that we felt were at greater risk than others.
This dialog has been very robust. It will continue. It supports
the 60-day cybersecurity sprint that the Secretary has put in
place for the transportation sector which began the first of
September, runs through the end of October. So there has been
an awful lot of effort on that and I think we have made some
very good progress.
Ms. Watson Coleman. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you very much.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Florida, Mr.
Gimenez, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Gimenez. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
I was listening to the testimony, I am--you know, I had a
line of questioning, but I am going to change my line of
questioning.
So, Administrator Pekoske, in order for somebody to get
from Europe to the United States what do they need to show in
terms of COVID? Do they need to show they're vaccinated, do
they need to show that they have had a negative test? Somebody
coming from Europe here, what do they need to show?
Mr. Pekoske. Yes, sir.
New procedures will come in place very shortly where they
need to show that they are vaccinated and have had a test
within a certain number of hours prior to flight.
Mr. Gimenez. Somebody coming from Canada, what do they need
to show?
Mr. Pekoske. Same, sir. By air.
Mr. Gimenez. The same thing. Somebody crossing the border
from the south, what do they need to show?
Mr. Pekoske. They don't need to show the same things coming
from the Southwest Border. This is also based on advice we have
received from the Centers for Disease Control.
Mr. Gimenez. So the Centers for Disease Control seem to
think that somehow the virus somehow is more contagious coming
from Europe and from Canada than it is coming from the Southern
Border, which kind-of blows up the whole argument about
following the science, doesn't it?
Mr. Pekoske. Sir, I am not a medical expert.
Mr. Gimenez. No, I am not saying--I am not saying--no, sir,
that is not for you. That is my comment. This whole thing about
following the science is a bunch of hooey. If we tell Canadians
that they have to be vaccinated and show a proof of negative
test, we do the same thing with Europeans, and we do nothing
for people crossing the Southern Border. So this whole thing
about the CDC following the science, it really doesn't. It
follows political science, but not really the science.
So, you know, it is very--it has been very, very
illuminating today's testimony.
One thing I would like to ask, one thing that I do support
is the fine work that our TSA agents are doing with all these
different kinds of guidances they are getting from the CDC and
everybody else, the fine work that they do on the ground. I
would hope, sir, that you find the way to increase their pay
and benefits of those that are doing the great work that the
TSA does.
I know that I proposed that during our mark-up to actually
increase the pay, and unfortunately the Majority voted it down.
So what steps are you taking to increase the pay and the
benefits of those people that are on the ground doing this
great work?
Mr. Pekoske. Yes, sir, I couldn't agree with you more. I
think it is an absolute imperative that we increase the pay for
anyone in TSA, especially the front-line work force where there
is a pay discrepancy between what they get paid and what their
counterparts in the rest of Government would get paid. They
have very, very difficult jobs to do, significant
responsibility on their shoulders, and very arduous work hours
as well. They are showing up at 3 o'clock in the morning in
many airports to begin to open the screening process.
My top priority is to continue to improve pay, but I want
to improve it--and I know the Chairman agrees with this 100
percent--as substantially as we can to get that equity in the
system and to properly compensate people going forward.
I would note that we have made attempts and we have made
some progress increasing pay, but it has not been enough. It is
really important for us. We spent a lot of money with people
that come into TSA and find--and they identify for us the No. 1
reason they leave is because of the pay. It is very expensive
to recruit and retain people without adequate pay structure. So
I am 100 percent in support of that. We will work very, very
hard to make sure we get across the finish line.
Mr. Gimenez. Thank you very much, Administrator. I yield my
time back.
Chairman Thompson. The Chair recognizes the gentlelady from
Florida for 5 minutes, Mrs. Demings.
Mrs. Demings. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman. Thank you to
our witnesses for being with us today to discuss, of course,
this extremely important issue. I want to, first of all,
associate myself with the remarks of my colleagues who paused
for just a moment to take the time to thank our TSOs for the
extraordinary job that they do every day. We all travel a lot
and I think it is important that we let them know that we see
them, that we hear them, and that we do appreciate them.
Since 9/11, we all know that we have come a long way in
terms of, I believe, our preparation. Interagency cooperation,
we have heard discussion about that, information sharing. But
Admiral Loy, you said something to the effect that you find
little comfort in the fact that we have not been attacked in 20
years. Meaning, that we must remain ever-vigilant in our
efforts to make sure that we are not attacked. Admiral, you
mentioned that you felt there was more work to do in terms of
establishing a better link between the TSA and the IC
community. Could you just talk a little bit more about that?
Mr. Loy. Yes, ma'am. Thanks for your question. My reference
was to where we were on 9/11/01 and where we found ourselves 20
years later. Of course, that is being the purpose of this look-
back for the committee. I was only endorsing as a constant, the
responsibility of both the committee itself, as well as the
administrator and the people in the Executive branch
government, to be conscious of and focused on continuing that
linkage between the intelligence community writ large and that
information from within the intelligence community that can be
actionable for TSA. To the degree we continue to focus on that,
we don't let it--we don't assume that we are there. We don't
assume that we are going to be there in the future. But,
rather, it is one of those elements of constant focus that we
always have on our table both in the administrator's chair, in
the committee's discussions with regard to their
responsibilities, and that we just don't begin to take for
granted that once we were there we are going to stay there.
This is an evolutionary challenge just as we heard with
regard to the comments about Afghanistan and the resurgence of
the Taliban. If that is a opportunity for us to be concerned,
we should focus on that in a continuing manner going into the
future. Thanks for your thought on that, or your focus on that.
Mrs. Demings. Well, thank you so much for your response on
that. Administrator Pistole, since 9/11, how has the TSA's
mission and operations drawn on and contributed to the work of
the intelligence community?
Mr. Pistole. Well, thank you, Congresswoman. It is
interesting because I am testifying from the National
Intelligence University in Bethesda where I am on the Board of
Visitors. There is an intelligence collection cycle that is
inherent in what TSA does. I know I was impressed when I came
over from the FBI in 2010 to become administrator, how robust
and informed TSA was in the morning intelligence briefings as
it related to transportation issues. TSA was getting the same
information that the FBI was and so, it was that inherent
dependence upon and reliance upon risk-based security.
One of the keys is risk-based intelligence-driven. So, you
can't just do things as Admiral Pekoske has said, you can't
just do it in a vacuum. It is all based on what is the latest
intelligence. Is there a non-metallic IED threat out there? Is
there a cargo threat out there? Is there a suicide bomber
threat or hijackers, whatever it may be?
So, that is the way TSA starts off every day is--at least
when I was there, in terms of having that intelligence-informed
start to say here is where we need to go based on the
intelligence.
Mrs. Demings. Thank you so much. Mr. Chairman, I can't see
the clock. Do I have time for one more question?
Administrator Pekoske, just very quickly. We know that on
the front line with the TSOs or local enforcement, and I think
we have continued to further build a more functional and
effective relationship. Could you just talk a little bit about
the information sharing working relationship with local law
enforcement?
Mr. Pekoske. Yes, ma'am. Local law enforcement absolutely
critical to the safety and security of everybody in the
airport. They have been wonderful partners with us at airports
around the country. Orlando absolutely included in that from
your time there. Local law enforcement is very important now
for--even more so, because we are seeing more disturbances both
inflight and in checkpoints. Local law enforcement is right
there to make sure that our officers are fully protected and a
situation is deescalated as quickly as it can be.
Additionally, as we have talked about, you know, public
area security is very, very important. Local law enforcement
presence and sometimes augmented by our own VIPR teams from
TSA, it is really important to just let people know that law
enforcement is there, present roaming around. If anybody has a
situation, they are readily nearby to be able to address it.
So, I am very, very proud of our partnership with local law
enforcement and salute all the law enforcement officers,
particularly this week for their service to our country and to
our officers.
Mrs. Demings. Thank you so much. Mr. Chairman, I yield
back. Thank you.
Chairman Thompson. The gentlelady yields back. The Chair
recognizes the gentleman from New York, Mr. Garbarino.
Mr. Garbarino. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to
the Ranking Member for having this hearing. Thank you to all
the witnesses that are here. The bulk of my questions are for
Administrator Pekoske.
One thing I am going submit into record, I have a report
here by Security Scorecard that they conducted on the pipeline
security shortly after the Colonial attack. The report notes
that while the cybersecurity posture of pipeline industry as a
whole is better than the Fortune 500, there is a wide variance
within the industry with Colonial at the bottom of the list
before the breach. I am going to submit this report into the
record and send it with some questions. I hope you can look
through it and get me some answers to those questions because I
am sure you haven't seen the report yet, but I would appreciate
it----
Chairman Thompson. Without objection,----
Mr. Garbarino [continuing]. Without objection.
Chairman Thompson [continuing]. So ordered.*
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* The information has been retained in committee files and is
available at https://securityscorecard.pathfactory.com/all/the-state-
of-cybersecurity-in-the-energy-pipeline-industry-in-north-america.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Mr. Garbarino. Yep, thank you.
Mr. Pekoske. Yes, sir. I would be happy to look at it and
provide some reaction to it. Thank you.
Mr. Garbarino. Thank you. But so, my other questions though
now are, as you know, the bulk of the TSA's funding and
employees are focused on commercial aviation, but TSA has a
responsibility for the security of cargo, air cargo, general
aviation, mass transit, freight, rail, highway, infrastructure,
pipeline, and ferries. Does TSA have the appropriate funding
and employees dedicated to working on pipeline security? If
not, what additional resources or support would you need from
Congress to fulfill this responsibility?
Mr. Pekoske. Yes, sir. We have increased the size of our
pipeline security staff significantly over the past couple of
years and, actually, the staff of all of our surface
transportation security modes. So, we are making progress in
that regard. Additionally, we have added about 54 cyber
professionals, both on the policy side and on the operations
side, you know, with that critical cybersecurity expertise that
is so important across the entire system, you know, and to
include aviation and surface. But these are dedicated primarily
to surface transportation.
Rest assured we will include in our budget requests any
resources that we need. We recognize, of course, that the risk
is changing with domestic terrorists now becoming more
prominent in our risk profile. We want to make sure that we do
everything we can in the assistance that we provide to the
owners and operators of those systems is as robust as possible.
So, I thank you for your question.
Mr. Garbarino. You mentioned domestic terrorists, but I
am--it seems when we deal with cybersecurity, most of it is
coming from overseas. Is that something you are seeing mostly
that it is more international and not domestic?
Mr. Pekoske. Yes, sir.
Mr. Garbarino. Yes.
Mr. Pekoske. Yes, sir, mostly overseas-based.
Mr. Garbarino. OK, thank you. I want to go, TSA has now
issued two security directives to the pipeline industry
following the ransomware attack on Colonial. Can you provide
the committee with an update to where those--where things
stand? Is the pipeline industry better prepared to defend
against future attacks?
Mr. Pekoske. Yes, sir, thank you. The pipeline industry is
unquestionably better prepared to respond to future attacks.
The first security directive, there has been 100 percent
compliance with the first security directive. The second
security directive still has some deadlines that have not yet
been achieved in terms of, hey, we got some deadlines in--later
into 2022. But so far, the dialog we have had with the owners
and operators that are subject to those security directives has
been very, very good and I think we are on a very good path
with Security Directive 02. As has been mentioned, we intend to
take what we have learned from both security directives in
pipeline and apply it more broadly across the transportation
sector.
Mr. Garbarino. You had said--I know you had said before you
are working with CEOs and CISOs of companies making sure that
they are better prepared for these cyber attacks. Has that been
receptive across pipeline owners and operators, as well as
across the board, I guess?
Mr. Pekoske. Yes, sir, very perceptive and actually very
regular as well. To have, you know, we have regular
opportunities to engage to make sure that we are all on track
to get the cyber directives fully implemented and also look at
other ways that we might provide better cybersecurity overall
for the system. Additionally, any CEO knows that if they want
to call and talk to me about anything, that is absolutely their
privilege to do, and I would be happy to have those
conversations.
Mr. Garbarino. I appreciate it. One final question, just
switching. It is not about cyber, but TSA PreCheck. I
understand that the TSA has entered into 3 more contracts for
TSA PreCheck services. What steps is TSA taking to ensure there
is no brand confusion between companies and that all provide
these services at equivalent level of service?
Mr. Pekoske. Yes, sir. That is something that we are very,
very focused on to make sure that when we do roll out the 2
additional vendors for PreCheck enrollment, that there is no
brand confusion there. We will work with both those vendors as
we get through the IT certification process with both of them
so that we are well-prepared when the rollout time comes.
Mr. Garbarino. If you could give me a more detailed answer
to that later on. I know I am out of time. That would be great.
Thank you----
Mr. Pekoske. OK.
Mr. Garbarino [continuing]. Very much and I yield back.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you very much. The Chair
recognizes the gentlelady from California, Ms. Barragan, for 5
minutes.
Ms. Barragan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. TSA Administrator
Pekoske, if I showed up at the airport today and I didn't have
a photo ID, it is true that I might still be able to fly. Is
that correct?
Mr. Pekoske. Yes, ma'am, that is correct.
Ms. Barragan. As a matter of fact, isn't it true that on
TSA.gov there is an entire section that says, forgot your ID?
And talks about the procedures you may have to go through if
you don't have an ID?
Mr. Pekoske. Yes, ma'am, and it happens every single day
across our system.
Ms. Barragan. Thank you. I just wanted to clarify that
because there is not a different standard. It is not like if
you are in the United States, you are a citizen and you show up
at the airport, you are going to be denied a flight. But if you
are a migrant and you have other paperwork, that you are
allowed to board.
As a matter of fact, a few months ago, I was at a airport
and I assisted a migrant and saw and witnessed first-hand what
TSA did in an instance where you had migrants with paperwork
from CBP showing that they had been registered at the border
and were proceeding on. I have to tell you, it was a very
thorough process. So, I want to thank you for the work that the
men and women are doing to ensure that our flights are safe. My
2 sisters are flight attendants. There is nobody more important
to me than family and making sure we are taking care of those
in our skies and the American people. So, I want to say thank
you for that.
I want to talk a little bit about the topic of unruly
passengers. Last week, a major U.S. carrier proposed creating a
centralized database of unruly passengers, ensuring that
passengers banned by one airline for hazardous behavior, can be
treated similarly by other carriers. Let's start with you, TSA
Administrator Pekoske, what is your reaction to this proposal?
If the major carriers, in fact, move forward with this concept,
do you see a role for TSA in implementing it?
Mr. Pekoske. Yes, thank you, ma'am. Before I answer that
question, just to you, personally, please thank your sisters
for the very, very important work they do as flight attendants.
That is a very difficult job. As we have seen inflight
disturbances go up over time, it has become more difficult over
the course of the summer. So, I really appreciate the work that
all the flight attendants and all the flight deck crew do each
and every day to help keep our systems secure.
Ms. Barragan. Thank you.
Mr. Pekoske. With respect to the individual carrier no-fly
lists, I mean, the carriers have made a judgment, many of them
have that when passengers refuse to wear masks or they create
an inflight disturbance, that they deny them future flight on
their carrier. The challenge here is that the standards carrier
to carrier may be somewhat different. So, in terms of, you
know, across the system, I personally do not see a role for TSA
there. I think that is private-sector carrier to private-sector
carrier in terms of how they want to coordinate what they do
and share information. But I would be concerned about the
standards that they apply to place somebody on a list.
Really, you know, the better terminology for these lists
is, you know, no-fly means something different to TSA. That
means that there is a connection with terrorism when you say
no-fly in TSA. These are really do not boards. You know, that,
you know, they are denying flight, do not board in the future.
But, you know, I know they are going to continue to work on
this collaboration across the carriers.
Ms. Barragan. Well, thank you for that. I am not sure I
completely agree. I think it is a safety issue. But I
completely understand the response. Just to go around the
panel, does anybody else want to comment on their reaction to
this proposal?
OK, hearing none, I will move on to the next question.
Between March 2020 and July 2021, there were over 85 physical
assaults on TSOs and other, 3,600 inflight disturbances, as you
just mentioned, Mr. Administrator. Just last week, there were
reports that a passenger choked a flight attendant and
attempted to storm the cockpit on a flight from Boston to San
Juan. Earlier this summer, news reports highlighted passengers
literally biting TSOs. In contrast, there were only 1,230
inflight disturbances in 2019. What additional actions can TSA
take to deter these incidents and fight back against this surge
in unruly passengers?
Mr. Pekoske. Yes, ma'am, thank you for highlighting that
situation. It makes the job of a TSO ever more difficult when
you are subject to an assault. Verbal assaults are bad enough,
but physical assaults cross a different threshold. We have seen
an increase in physical assaults in our checkpoints and
certainly in physical assaults and verbal assaults in in-flight
instances. Our posture is for every disturbance in a
checkpoint, we proceed with a civil penalty action. That may or
may not result in a civil penalty. It depends on what the
investigation shows. But in many cases, it does. So, we always
proceed with a civil penalty action.
The FAA controls in-flight disturbances in aircraft. I know
the FAA has been very, very forward-leaning on this. Their
fines are quite substantial and I think they have had some good
success there.
So, this is an area of significant concern for us. Finally,
to build on what Congresswoman Demings had raised, in a
checkpoint whenever there is a disturbance, local law
enforcement will often proceed with a State or local charge
against those individuals as well. So, you know, it is
basically us doing everything we can within our authorities to
hold folks that create these disturbances accountable for their
actions and to absolutely include our State and local partners
in that operation.
Ms. Barragan. Thank you, sir. Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Chairman Thompson. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from
Kansas, Mr. LaTurner, for 5 minutes.
Mr. LaTurner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate it.
Director Pekoske, I appreciate you being here today, and I want
to talk about a couple different topics. But first, I
understand that TSA plans to replace the aging explosive
detection systems for checked baggage with the same type of
systems, with the same standards. We know that international
airports are already using better systems. Could you talk to me
about this and why we aren't upgrading the standards?
Mr. Pekoske. Yes, sir. I wouldn't agree that international
airports are using better systems across the board. Our goal is
to make sure that we are the gold standard for systems that
detect threats both in checked baggage and in checkpoints. Part
of the upgrade, if you will, is not necessarily a hardware
upgrade in these systems. There are some rather significant
software upgrades that we have made that improve our
detectability in our what we call explosive detection systems
for checked bags in airports around the country.
Mr. LaTurner. Are there systems out there that are better?
You said that you wouldn't agree that generally they are all
better. But are there systems that are better than ours than--I
know we want to be the gold standard, but once you are through
this process of upgrading, will we be?
Mr. Pekoske. We will be, yes, sir. You know, we will
continue to upgrade our installed base of technology with
software updates. We do that on a regular basis. We have made
some very, very good progress there. We share that progress
also with our international partners because it is in our
interest as well as theirs that we all have this close standard
of detection that we can, particularly for flights, obviously,
that are destined for the United States.
Mr. LaTurner. I appreciate that. As you know well, the
lynchpin of our security screening system is to make sure that
people are who they say they are. How can we better incorporate
biometrics into the process such as in the CAT machines where
you put your driver's license and give it to a TSA officer for
review? How can we make that better and include biometrics
within it?
Mr. Pekoske. We are working on just that, sir, to have what
we call a one-to-one match, biometric match, so when you insert
your driver's license or your passport into the credential
authentication technology, what that technology will do in the
future is it will pull your image on your credential, digitize
that image, and then a camera system will capture an image of
you as you are standing in front of the officer and then the
technology compares those digital images together. The match
capability is significant. It is much better than if you were
doing it visually. The important thing with this is that that
is a one-to-one match. It is not a gallery of images. It is the
image that is on your credential. Then once the passenger
removes their credential, all that image data is erased. So, we
don't retain any of that information at all because we have no
further use for it.
Mr. LaTurner. What is the roll-out of that going to look
like? Will that be available to TSA PreCheck people first or,
you know, the CBP's Global Entry, or the Known Crewmember
programs? If you are working on it, what will that look like
and what is the time frame?
Mr. Pekoske. Yes, sir. We have been prototyping it now in
several airports across the country. It has worked very, very
well. We have a process whenever we prototype, our process is
generally to opt-in so that passengers don't have to
affirmatively say I want out. They affirmatively say I want to
use that new technology. Then our goal overall is as we
introduce new technologies----
Mr. LaTurner. But with----
Mr. Pekoske [continuing]. Into the process----
Mr. LaTurner. Excuse me, but with PreCheck folks, like
those folks have already opted in.
Mr. Pekoske. Right.
Mr. LaTurner. So, that would be the place you are going to
start? Is that what you are saying?
Mr. Pekoske. Yes, and with PreCheck now, we are having
people provide their facial images upon registration. So, we
already have that data. So, that opt-in has already been done.
What I was going to say is as we deploy technology, we like to
put it first in PreCheck.
Mr. LaTurner. OK, all right. Is the pace of hiring for TSA
officers keeping up with attrition?
Mr. Pekoske. Pace of hiring is keeping up with attrition,
but I am concerned about hiring overall. I think everybody in
the aviation industry is concerned about hiring overall. That
is one of the reasons why these pay initiatives are so
important because, you know, without a predictable level of pay
that is going to increase over time, it is harder and harder to
recruit people into the Federal Government. It is also harder
and harder to retain people in service. So, you know, to me, it
improves our ability to recruit. It vastly improves our ability
to retain. Fundamentally, it is the right thing to do.
Mr. LaTurner. I appreciate that and I appreciate your time
today. I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you very much. The gentleman
yields back. We had our membership ask questions, but what I
would like to do to kind-of wrap things up is give our
witnesses the opportunity to look for the next 20 years for TSA
and see what kind of thoughts they might have that they can
provide the committee with in terms of what that 20 years on
the TSA might look like. So, Admiral Joy, I will start off with
you and kind-of bring it forward.
Mr. Loy. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. I think my thinking with
regard to the adequacy of both the committee's sort-of
inventory of concerns and, of course, the administrator's
inventory of concerns and making certain that there is a
matching effort, and, of course, hearings do that.
Conversations among Members and TSA employees do that as well.
But my concerns for the future are just to be consistent with
regard to what has been our concerns, and I hate to say it, but
over a pretty successful window of these 20 years. As I
indicated in my original testimony, I take no great comfort in
the fact that we have been as successful as we have been over
20 years. I just want to make sure that we have the focus and
oversight and adequate attention that continues to be vigilant
going forward.
So, my concern would just be to take stock of what happened
just now in Afghanistan and see what that evolutionary change
to the threat index is and how we need to be compensating for
it going forward. So, my notion, sir, is that the committee and
the administrator looking into the next 20 years, has the same
vigilance that has proven successful for us as a country in
traveling safely and securely for this past 20 years and making
sure that the constancy of focus is never let down.
Chairman Thompson. Mr. Pistole.
Mr. Pistole. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think I would
summarize my perspective for the next 20 years really within
the categories of personnel that we have had some great
testimony about today in terms of the importance of supporting
the work force so there is not high attrition so people aren't
looking to go to other agencies or the private sector to get
better pay or better benefits. So, I think that personnel
investment is critical to helping to continue the
professionalization of the work force.
The second is in policies. That relates to making sure that
the administrator and future administrators has those
authorities that enable him or her to make sure they can take
decisive action in the face of threats and can do that in the
interagency arena, not only domestically, but internationally.
The importance of doing that and to be recognized for that
authority and ability.
Then third, as I have mentioned, is on technology. To make
sure that we are not nickel-and-diming investments in
technology that hamper our efforts to provide world-class
security in the way that most Americans who travel expect and,
frankly, who the world looks to for leadership through
international associations such as IATA and others to say what
is the United States doing and how are they setting the trends
that can make sure that they are providing the world's best
security in the most efficient way. So, I think those three
things would be what I would be looking for as the continued
maturation of TSA continues over the next 20 years.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you very much. Admiral.
Mr. Neffenger. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will, of course,
echo exactly what my colleagues have said. Let me say with
respect to work force, as I said in my opening statement, it is
one of the best work forces I have ever had the pleasure. I say
that after 34 years of working with a great work force in the
Coast Guard, but the TSA work force is one of the most
professional. We need to support them. We need to pay them
adequately. We need to assure that we can retain them after we
do so. There have been a number of things said to that effect
already.
With respect to technology, you never have a perfect
system, but you can have a better system every day. It is
critical that we invest in the technology refresh and
improvement. I think it is also critical that we engage the
private sector more effectively when it comes to that. That
means getting requirements out, allowing the private sector to
help us develop the technologies we need, and maybe looking at
the possibility of technology as a service, the way we look at
software as a service so that the private sector can refresh
faster than the Government will ever be able to given the
challenges with respect to budgets and so forth. So, I think
that there is opportunity for transforming the way we bring
technology to operations on a daily basis.
Then finally, with respect to intelligence, you know, TSA
is first and foremost an intelligence agency with a very
challenging front-line operational mission. So, I would echo
that need to maintain that connection to the intelligence that
tells us rapidly what we need to foresee for the future. I
would just end by saying I want to thank you for the support
that this committee has had. I think it is critical that TSA
and Congress work closely together and I certainly appreciated
the oversight when I was there. I know that sounds odd to say
you appreciate Congressional oversight, but when I put aside
the personal side of it and said this is about making sure the
agency does the right things, you collectively ask the right
questions. You dig into the right kinds of issues. In my
experience, you were always, you know, very supportive of the
work of the agency. So, thank you, sir.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you. Mr. Administrator.
Mr. Pekoske. Yes, sir. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I agree
with what all of my predecessors have mentioned. I would just
highlight a couple things. One is intel-based and risk-based
operations going forward. It is the core of TSA as Peter has
just mentioned. I think we need to continue to ensure that we
best leverage the resources of the U.S. Government overall, the
resources of our intelligence community, and best contribute to
the development of intelligence in the United States. So, I
think that is key going forward.
The second thing I would emphasize is there will be
increased investment in surface transportation security. It is
an imperative. The threat is changing. We just need to get
about the business of doing this. We are already on a path. But
I predict that will be a continuous evolution over the course
of the next several years.
Next, I think we need to rather than replace all our
technology at once, we need to have a continuous refresh
process for our technology so that we are always at the leading
edge. You know, don't make it easy for somebody to look at our
system and try to assess what we can detect and not because
they just won't know what technology they might encounter when
they go through our screening processes or their baggage or
their cargo goes through our process.
The next is very, very strong partnerships. We have them
already. They have been in my time as the administrator, they
have been a significant key to our country's success in
providing transportation security, and I would submit also to
the success globally. Because we are a global leader. We will
remain a global leader. Having the private sector deeply
involved in that is critically important for us.
Finally, I predict that we will have a more and more
specialized work force as technology continues to improve. We
continue to hone our procedures. With that will come more clear
career paths for our employees. A greater overall professional
development opportunities for them. Greater diversity in our
work force.
We have one of the most diverse work forces in the Federal
Government at the entry level and at the front lines of our
organization and our screening checkpoints. As you mentioned at
the very beginning of this hearing, that is not the case as you
go up through the middle and the upper levels of the agency. We
need to fix that. We need to fix it properly. We have stood up
an inclusion action committee. I have established a diversity
equity and inclusion position that reports directly for me to
make sure we have a constant effort in this regard going
forward.
Sir, I would conclude by thanking you as the Chairman. You
and I have known each other for a good number of years. Ranking
Member Katko and I have known each other for a good number of
years. The two of you and the entire committee have been very,
very supportive of TSA. You hold us accountable where we need
to be held accountable, but you are always there with a
solution to help us along. I greatly appreciate that oversight
and your leadership in this regard, sir.
Chairman Thompson. Well, thank you very much. One of the
questions all of us have historically asked every
administrator, do you have all the authorities and all the
budget that you need to do your job? Somehow all the
administrators would come back with, well, if Congress provided
us resources, we would use those resources to the best of our
ability. You would never say yes or no. So, I guess somewhere
there is a training camp for future TSA administrators that you
never acknowledge whether you have all the authorities or all
the monies you need. You just kind of you are able to do it. I
think the Ranking Member is cognizant of that too. But let me
assure you that we are committed to the mission of the agency.
We have had excellent administrators. Technology is the way
forward and the force multiplier for security. So, we
absolutely have to get it right.
The one thing we did not talk about is how can we expedite
procurement so that by the time as the Ranking Member will tell
you, we got a technology but by the time we buy it, it is
already obsolete. So, we somehow we have to--we passed some
legislation but we still need to ramp it up.
So, let me again thank the current administrator and past
administrators for their testimony and our Members for their
questions. The Members of the committee may have additional
questions for the witnesses and we ask that you respond
expeditiously in writing to those questions. Our Ranking
Member, would you want to have a closing comment or something?
Mr. Katko. Yes, I appreciate the opportunity, Mr. Chairman.
I just want to say, you know, observing the back and forth
today, it makes me very proud to be part of this committee
because it was productive. There was no gotcha questions. I
think we are just trying to make sure we do the proper
oversight, but make sure we give you the tools you need to do
your job. That is really our role in Congress. Absent of
theatrics today, we did a good job, I think, all the way
around, all the witnesses did and all the questioners. So, I
commend everybody on both sides and keep up the good work and
please tell everybody at TSA how proud we are of them
especially the front-line workers. I yield back, thank you.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you very much. I am glad the
Ranking Member mentioned that. But in response to the screening
of nonresident aliens, the policy that is followed now is a
policy that has been in place since we started. So, that is not
policy of the last 6 months. It is the policy. So, I want this
hearing to reflect that there is no special policy right now.
It is the policy. So, I want the administrator to reflect that
going forward that his explanation was what the policy is and
what it always has been.
So, the Chair reminds the Members that the committee's
record will remain open for 10 business days. Without
objection, the committee stands adjourned. Thank you,
gentlemen, again.
[Whereupon, at 12:12 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
----------
Questions From Chairman Bennie G. Thompson for David P. Pekoske
covid-19 workforce vaccinations
Question 1a. What efforts does TSA have planned to encourage as
many TSA employees and contractors as possible to get vaccinated
against COVID-19?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 1b. How is TSA engaging with the American Federation of
Government Employees (AFGE) on those efforts?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 2. How is TSA working to ensure all TSOs, including those
who work part-time, have ample opportunity during duty time to access
TSA-owned computers to upload their vaccination information?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 3. What consequences is TSA contemplating or currently
pursuing for employees who refuse to get vaccinated?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
vaccine mandate for passengers
Question 4. What are the potential challenges and advantages of
implementing a vaccine mandate for domestic travel?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 5a. What conversations with other agency partners, such as
the CDC, has TSA had regarding the implementation of a health
credential to verify a person's vaccine status for travel, if the
administration were to announce a vaccine requirement?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 5b. What are the potential challenges and benefits?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question From Hon. J. Luis Correa for David P. Pekoske
Question. Our TSA agents are our last line of defense protecting
our airline passengers. As ``bad folks'' get more sophisticated, we
have to be much more prepared, and we have to anticipate them.
Complicating your job is the fact that the line between foreign and
domestic terrorists is now a blurred line. How are you approaching this
new reality? What actions are you taking to assure that info sharing,
especially amongst Federal agencies, is taking place in an effective
and timely manner to help you in this new environment? And how can
Congress help you do your job better?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Questions From Hon. Michael Guest for David P. Pekoske
Question 1. In Mississippi, we have 2 Category II airports and 5
Category IV airports, however most updated equipment is sent to larger
airports. What is TSA doing to ensure that smaller airports have the
opportunity to receive updated equipment?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 2. Mississippi has received verbal commitment from TSA for
K-9 allocation but has not received a commitment in writing. Could you
please advise when TSA Mississippi will receive notice of an official
K-9 allocation?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Questions From Hon. Diana Harshbarger for David P. Pekoske
Question 1. The PreCheck program has been a huge success, and with
travel recovering it's going to be more important than ever.
Stakeholders have raised real concerns about pending changes to
PreCheck enrollment, and the potential for privacy issues, and traveler
confusion related to enrollment and renewal. PreCheck has been such a
critical success, has TSA fully thought through the customer experience
before making such significant changes?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 2. The success of the PreCheck program could be enhanced
if we focused enrollment in communities that have not been widely
exposed to the program, such as rural communities. What is TSA doing,
and what should it be doing, to reach rural populations through mobile
enrollment, and other communities where enrollment has lagged?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 3. With the potential for additional vendors being added
to PreCheck enrollment, what will TSA do to ensure the safety of
traveler data, and how will TSA prevent this data from being used for
private commercial purposes? Has TSA issued clear privacy guidelines?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Questions From Hon. Carlos A. Gimenez for David P. Pekoske
Question 1. What is the process that TSA uses to vet migrants who
arrive at airport checkpoints without U.S. Government-issued photo
identification? How many migrants has TSA screened at airport
checkpoints since January 2021, both through the National
Transportation Vetting Center and the CBP One app?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 2. How many migrants has TSA prohibited from entering
airport checkpoints Nation-wide since January 2021? Why were these
migrants prohibited from entering airport checkpoints? Is law
enforcement called in those cases? What happened to the migrants who
were denied access to the checkpoint?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 3. At what airports does TSA have a CBP One app pilot? Is
TSA able to see in the CBP One app how often each migrant has traveled
domestically via air?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 4. How many Haitian migrants who recently departed from
Del Rio, Texas have traveled via air through U.S. airports? How was
their vetting process handled by TSA officers at these security
checkpoints?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
[all]
